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Avidan Y. Cover*
The current constitutional torts system under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 affords little relief to victims of
government wrongdoing. Victims of police brutality
seeking accountability and compensation from local
police departments find their remedies severely limited
because the municipal liability doctrine demands
plaintiffs meet near-impossible standards of proof
relating to policies and causation.
This Article provides a revisionist historical account
of the origin of the Supreme Court’s municipal liability
doctrine. Most private claims for damages against
cities or police departments do not implicate the
doctrine’s early federalism concerns over protracted
federal judicial interference with local governance.
Meanwhile, the federal government imposes extensive
reforms on local police departments through the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C.
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§ 14141. The resulting system of bifurcated municipal
liability for police misconduct ignores history. It
permits government-initiated, systemic injunctive relief
claims to flow readily, but effectively bans individual
victims’ discrete damages claims.
This Article proposes making it easier for individuals
to sue local governments for police brutality. Reducing
the standard for damages relief does not offend
federalism principles and realizes objectives critical to
the constitutional remedial system: compensation,
trust, vindication of rights, and appropriate
assignment of responsibility. This Article proposes a
remedial scheme authorizing civil actions for police
brutality victims against local governments for (1) a
pattern or practice of local government police
misconduct, and (2) isolated instances where a local
police department lacks a policy and there is national
consensus among other local departments that the
policy is necessary to prevent a particular
constitutional harm.
The proposal also expands
potential individual officer liability to instances in
which an officer ignores a specific policy of a local
police department aimed at preventing wrongdoing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Municipal liability is practically a dead letter. The Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence in this area is two-faced at best. In one
breath, the Court invokes the availability of a remedy for holding
local governments accountable for unconstitutional conduct like
systemic police brutality, yet constructs standards so impossibly
high that an aggrieved person rarely, if ever, can establish
municipal liability. It has been almost thirty years since the Court
found that a local “policy caused a constitutional violation.”1 This
anemic municipal liability frustrates the Court’s purported
balancing of the protection of individual constitutional rights—
through compensation and deterrence of misconduct—and the
guardianship of local autonomy.2 Moreover, the doctrine is part of
a parsimonious constitutional tort adjudication system that,
through qualified immunity, generally denies police brutality
victims a remedy against government employees.3
Fred Smith, Local Sovereign Immunity, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 409, 414 (2016).
See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (finding that “the
principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in distributing the costs of
official misconduct”); id. (noting the “proper[ ] allocat[ion] [of] these costs among the three
principals in the scenario of the § 1983 cause of action: the victim of the constitutional
deprivation; the officer whose conduct caused the injury; and the public, as represented by
the municipal entity”).
3 See generally Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68
FLA. L. REV. 1773 (2016) (describing how qualified immunity doctrine and excessive force
case law work together to limit § 1983 remedies). All of the various other constitutional
torts doctrines favor government actors as well. Sovereign immunity insulates state
governments from damages liability for constitutional violations. See Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1890) (finding that the Eleventh Amendment, which clearly “prohibits
suits against a State . . . brought by the citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects
of a foreign State” is not “left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal
courts”); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding that
“person” in § 1983 does not include states or state agencies). Additionally, judicially crafted
causes of action afford meager accountability for individual federal law enforcement officers’
constitutional wrongdoings. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017) (“The Court’s
precedents now make clear that a Bivens remedy will not be available if there are ‘special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.’ ” (quoting
Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980) (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)))); id. at 1866 (recognizing that federal
officials are “entitled to qualified immunity with respect to ‘discretionary functions’
performed in their official capacities”). The Supreme Court’s rigorous pleadings standards
further discourage effective civil actions against government actors. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (holding that relief is not available “where the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct”).
1
2
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Because the bulk of people’s encounters with law enforcement
involve local officers, the limited civil remedy against local
governments and their agents is particularly troubling.4 Most
members of the public have little occasion to defensively invoke
constitutional protections by, for example, moving to suppress
unlawfully obtained evidence.5 People also will rarely seek
prospective relief enjoining police from a particular offensive
practice.6 An expanded conception of municipal liability, which
also significantly truncates the interrelated qualified immunity
doctrine, is therefore required so that police brutality victims may
obtain the chief constitutional civil remedy—damages.
Though proposals to reform police practices abound, there has
been little focus on the singular importance of securing
compensation.7 Current municipal liability doctrine does not
distinguish forms of relief, precluding damages claims based on
reasoning that, I argue, draws on inapposite concerns over
equitable remedies entangling federal courts in local governance.
A textbook account might draw the birth and evolution of
municipal liability in linear fashion. But like any good origins
story, the details are murkier. The Supreme Court first disavowed
municipal liability in 1961 in Monroe v. Pape based on its reading
4 Though other forms of government misconduct may also merit changes to government
immunity law, police brutality uniquely justifies expansion of local government liability
because of the public’s frequent, physical, and often involuntary interactions with officers
that may merge into harassment, profiling, searches, seizure, and violence. See LYNN
LANGTON & MATTHEW DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE BEHAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC
AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 1 (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.
pdf (finding that “over 62.9 million U.S. residents age 16 or older” had at least one contact
with police in 2011, and for approximately half of those people, “the most recent contact was
involuntary or police-initiated”).
5 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A]ssuming [petitioner’s]
innocent of the crime charged, the ‘exclusionary rule’ is simply irrelevant.”); Michael L.
Wells, Civil Recourse, Damages-As-Redress, and Constitutional Torts, 46 GA. L. REV. 1003,
1051–52 (2012) (noting that in some situations it is not possible for constitutional rights to
be raised defensively).
6 See, e.g., Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
7 See generally, e.g., POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT
(Angela J. Davis ed., 2017) (addressing important areas including the country’s violent racial
past, racial disparities in sentencing, policing of black males, racial profiling, implicit bias
instruction, police and community relations, and prosecutorial and grand jury reforms);
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING
SERVS., FINAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING (2015),
https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p311-pub.pdf (describing the need for changes in
policies and procedures due to fatal police shootings throughout the country).
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of 42 U.S.C. § 1983’s legislative history.8 Only seventeen years
later, the Court reversed itself in Monell v. Department of Social
Services, offering a wholly different reading of the legislative
history.9 Yet in breathing life into municipal liability, Monell
reflects much ambivalence about the remedy.
Although the Monell Court upheld a municipal liability claim, it
added the caveats that a constitutional violation must be tied to a
policy or custom and that liability does not attach through
respondeat superior.10 The subsequent near-four decades have
seen evolution and refinement of these caveats, which tend to limit
municipal liability through stringent causation and culpability
standards.
In particular, plaintiffs must establish that a
municipality’s “deliberate conduct . . . [is] the ‘moving force’ ”
causing the deprivation of federal rights.11 Plaintiffs must also
demonstrate that a municipality acted with deliberate indifference
to a “plainly obvious” risk that its action would violate the federal
right at issue.12
Commentators and the Court have generally attributed
Monell’s parsimonious municipal liability bent to a concern for
federalism that is easily traced back to the Monroe to Monell to
post-Monell progeny line.13 In its invocation of federalism, the
Court also stressed the negative financial effects that the damages
from an expansive municipal liability would visit on local
governments.14
This Article’s revisionist historical approach, however, reveals
that the above narrative is falsely circumscribed.15 The prevailing

See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
10 Id.
11 Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
12 Id. at 411.
13 See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 664 (noting that the Court in Monroe concluded that
Congress doubted its “constitutional power . . . to impose civil liability on municipalities”
(emphasis added) (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190)).
14 Id. at 664 n.9 (“Mr. Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, has suggested that the
municipal exclusion might more properly rest on a theory that Congress sought to prevent
the financial ruin that civil rights liability might impose on municipalities.” (citing City of
Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 517–20 (1973))).
15 By using the term “revisionist,” I engage here in what Arthur Schlesinger simply
describes as “a readiness to challenge official explanations.” ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.,
THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 165 (1986).
8
9

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE)

4/27/2018 8:49 AM

382

[Vol. 52:375

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

narrative ignores the Court’s earlier concerns over structural
reform litigation and civil rights injunctions that were at issue in
the 1960s and 1970s. Under a revisionist analysis, today’s
municipal liability doctrine may be better explained by the Court’s
unspoken and sublimated anxieties over impact litigation that
sought systematic reforms under federal judicial supervision.
Most lawsuits asserting municipal liability are more modest in
their aims, often seeking only damages or discrete equitable relief,
rather than institutional upheaval. These limited actions serve
the vital purpose of compensating victims of unconstitutional
municipal policies, practices, and customs. Permitting the public
to bring more constitutional tort damages claims against local
governments also supports principles of procedural justice16 and
civil recourse17—empowering community members, vindicating
constitutional rights against wrongdoers, and fostering trust in
courts’ fairness.
It is specifically these more modest damages claims that should
not be essentially barred on the same federalism grounds that are
animated by systematic structural reform litigation efforts. These
damages actions do not implicate the same federalism concerns.
Failing to appreciate the animating rationales of municipal
liability can lead to anomalous legal remedial schemes. The
current judicial and statutory framework for addressing police
brutality offers a useful example. The decline of municipal
liability as an avenue for limited judicial relief from police
brutality led, in part, to a surge in structural reform litigation and
police reform spurred by the federal executive via its
congressionally created authority under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, now 34
U.S.C. § 12601.18
16 See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30
CRIME & JUST. 283, 292–94 (2003) (discussing people’s willingness to defer to the decisions
made by legal authorities and stating that “people who receive outcomes that they regard as
unfavorable or unfair are more willing to accept those outcomes if they are arrived at
through procedures they regard as being fair”).
17 See Wells, supra note 5, at 1011–13; see also Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the
Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 437, 471–72 (discussing the importance of increasing
plaintiffs’ leverage and motivation for suing police and obtaining reforms through reduction
of barriers to police liability) [hereinafter Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?].
18 See 34 U.S.C.A. § 12601 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90) (stating that whenever
the Attorney General has reason to believe that a governmental authority has engaged in a
pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers that deprives persons of rights,
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These reforms have led to welcome and significant
improvements in police training, use of force, and accountability in
several police departments across the nation. But resource
constraints and political considerations often limit the scope of
reform. Moreover, parties involved in § 14141 litigation often fail
to sufficiently engage the local community—particularly police
misconduct victims—in the reform process. Finally, § 14141 is
solely prospective in its remedial reach, affording no compensation
to victims of police brutality.
Despite the limited ambit of § 14141 structural reform
litigation, the inevitably intrusive nature of these actions stands in
stark contrast to the banner of federalism that the Court has
invoked for some forty years in rejecting various individual
lawsuits asserting municipal liability. To be sure, Congress
granted the federal executive the authority to intercede in light of
the Court’s skepticism of judicially authorized institutional
litigation and reforms.
But the authority would appear to
contravene the Court’s concern over federal intrusion into local
law enforcement prerogatives. This Article addresses whether the
principles of federalism would be less offended were individuals
granted more fulsome damages remedies in the form of more
expansive municipal liability.
Moreover, ensuring municipal liability’s vitality is particularly
necessary in any era where the federal executive is not inclined to
pursue § 14141 actions. The Trump Administration has, for
example, indicated that it will not pursue litigation against local
police agencies for excessive force and other constitutional
violations, suggesting that it may even undo consent decrees
Where police department
entered pursuant to § 14141.19
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the U.S., he “may in a civil
action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or
practice”). 42 U.S.C. § 14141 has been reclassified as § 12601 of Title 34 of the United
States Code, Crime Control and Law Enforcement. This editorial reclassification was
implemented in the online version of the Code on September 1, 2017, and will appear in the
printed version of the Code in Supplement V of the 2012 Edition. To remain consistent with
cited works and to avoid confusion, I will use § 14141 throughout this Article to refer to the
provision of the Code that authorizes the Attorney General to institute a civil action against
police agencies that engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct.
19 Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s memo to Department of Justice officials suggests that
the federal government’s local law enforcement reform efforts may cease with the Trump
Administration, owing to some of these very federalism concerns. See Memorandum from
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accountability may so readily become a casualty of politicization,
the individual damages lawsuit should not be so easily precluded
by restrictive, judicially imposed standards resting on an
inapposite federalism rationale.
Adopting a more contextualized—or revisionist—history of
municipal liability should liberate the Court to revisit its
municipal liability jurisprudence. After all, this is a mess that the
Court has made. But the Court has proven so wedded to fending
off attempts to secure compensatory damages for government
wrongdoing that any hope for a more permissive municipal
liability damages standard lies with the Legislative Branch. To
the Congress’s credit, it did, at least, address some of the
Judiciary’s errors regarding equitable relief with its structural
reform legislation. Now, it should finish the job concerning
damages liability.
Part II of this Article charts the origins of the Monell standard
and revisits the legitimacy of the federalism concerns that
purportedly animate the restrictive causation requirement for
municipal liability under § 1983. Part III addresses one legislative
effort—§ 14141—to confront some of the Court’s jurisprudence
that limited the public and the government’s efforts to secure
police reforms. Part III also explores the shortcomings of § 14141,
particularly from a democratic and compensatory perspective, as
well as the significant federalism issues that the law raises.
Part IV argues that, because the Court’s federalism concerns
were motivated by the invasive nature of prospective relief,
damages claims merit a diminished standard of liability. This Part
lays out how the history and nature of damages relief also merit a
lesser showing for municipal liability. Part IV further demonstrates
that a more available damages remedy from local governments for
police abuses will foster victim compensation, improve the public’s

Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S.
Attorneys on Supporting Federal, State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement (Mar. 31, 2017)
[hereinafter Sessions Memo] (on file with the United States Department of Justice), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/954916/download (calling for a review of local law
enforcement reform efforts, including “existing or contemplated consent decrees” based, in
part, on the principle that “[l]ocal control and local accountability are necessary for effective
local policing” and “[i]t is not the responsibility of the federal government to manage nonfederal law enforcement agencies”).
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trust in the legal system, vindicate constitutional rights, and better
affix responsibility for wrongdoing.
Finally, Part V proposes a legislative framework for assessing
municipal liability claims seeking only damages relief. The
remedial scheme authorizes two civil actions for police brutality
victims against local governments for (1) a pattern or practice of
local government police misconduct, and (2) isolated instances
where a local police department lacks a policy and there is
national consensus among other local departments that the policy
is necessary to prevent a particular constitutional harm. The
proposal also expands potential individual officer liability to
instances in which an officer ignores a specific policy of a local
police department aimed at preventing wrongdoing. Part V
concludes by examining both the strengths and the weaknesses of
the proposed framework.
II. REVISING MONELL
A. MONROE V. PAPE

At the outset of the rebirth of § 1983 as a constitutional remedy
in 1961, the Supreme Court’s resistance to municipal liability was
distinguished by ostensible alarm over monetary damages’
debilitating financial impact on local governments. In Monroe v.
Pape the Supreme Court addressed a § 1983 lawsuit alleging the
abusive treatment by Chicago police officers, which sought
damages against both the officers and the city of Chicago.20 The
Court established for the first time that local government officials
could be held liable for constitutional violations under § 1983.21
Yet, the Court also held that municipalities enjoy immunity from
liability, reasoning that Congress had not intended municipalities
to fall within the scope of § 1983.22
The Court relied on the legislative history of the civil rights
action precursor to § 1983.
The Court construed the 42nd
Congress’s rejection of the Sherman Amendment to the 1871 Ku
Klux Klan Act, “which would have made ‘the inhabitants of the
20
21
22

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 169 (1961).
Id. at 172.
Id. at 187.
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county, city, or parish’ in which certain acts of violence occurred
liable ‘to pay full compensation’ to the person damaged or his widow
or legal representative,”23 as “so antagonistic” to preclude a reading
of “person” within § 1983 to include a municipal corporation.24
Monroe might have been viewed—as its author, Justice William
Douglas, believed—as divining congressional intent to limit the
costly and paralyzing effects of municipal liability for only
damages relief.25 But the Court eventually held in 1973 in City of
Kenosha v. Bruno that § 1983 also prohibits claims against
municipalities for declaratory and equitable relief.26 The general
bar on municipal liability would not, however, endure.
B. MONELL V. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Seventeen years after Monroe, the Court overturned its holding
as to municipal liability in Monell v. Department of Social Services,
reinterpreting the 1871 Act’s legislative history to permit lawsuits
against local governments.27 The Court held that the plaintiffs in
Monell were entitled to monetary relief in the form of retrospective
back pay based on a New York City agency’s “official policy”
requiring pregnant employees to take unpaid leave.28 The Court
set rigorous parameters for establishing liability, however, by
requiring that a constitutional violation be tied to a policy or
custom and concluding that a municipality could not be held
vicariously liable for its employees’ conduct.29
Id. at 188 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871)).
Id. at 191.
25 See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 516 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part)
(stating that the legislative history on which the Monroe Court’s construction of “person” in
§ 1983 was based “related to the fear of mulcting municipalities with damage awards for
unauthorized acts of its police officers”); id. app. at 517 (attributing the rejection of the
Sherman Amendment to “the notion that civil liability for damages might destroy or
paralyze local governments”).
26 Id. at 513.
27 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
28 Id. at 660–63. Though the relief sought was monetary, the plaintiffs did not bring “a
damage suit against the city itself, but instead an equitable action brought against
particular officials in their official capacity asking them to use their existing power to undo
the wrong they had committed.” David Jacks Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion: Justice
Powell, Monell, and the Meaning of “Color of Law,” 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 698–99 (2011)
[hereinafter Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion].
29 Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.
23
24
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The Court’s decision can be viewed as startling, in part because
it ran counter to principles of stare decisis. Monell was also a
product of, and a response to, the Court’s contradictory patchwork
of recent cases upholding and striking down civil lawsuits seeking
broad institutional reforms.
It was a compromise.
While
purporting to authorize lawsuits against local governments, the
standards it imposed reflected the Court’s ambivalence, if not
(growing) hostility, toward federal civil rights injunctions.
Coinciding with the Warren Court era, impact litigation reaped
a number of successes, particularly in reforming school
segregation and prison conditions.30 Expansive federal judicial
decrees in the 1950s and 1960s required that “forward-looking,
affirmative steps be taken to prevent future deprivations.”31 These
cases generally involved intricate prospective remedies rather
than simple damages. But over the next decade, structural reform
through litigation received substantial criticism.32 The transition
to the Burger Court saw a disenchantment with federal judicial
supervision of local government functions, a scaling back and
undoing of desegregation decrees, and a rejection of challenges to
prison conditions.33
It was into these crosscurrents of the law that the Court
confronted Monroe’s prohibition on municipal liability. Justice
William Brennan’s majority opinion in Monell relied on a revised
reading of legislative history to overturn the bar on municipal

30 See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1390–92 (2000)
[hereinafter Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation] (“The modern structural
reform revolution began in the 1950s, when federal courts began to hear cases asserting the
deprivation of rights to large groups of people by state and local institutions, such as schools
and prisons.” (footnote omitted)).
31 Id. at 1392; see, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)
(directing district courts to follow “equitable principles” in “fashioning and effectuating”
desegregation decrees).
32 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3–4 (2d ed. 1997) (characterizing the Warren Court’s activist
decision-making as a “continuing constitutional convention” in which the Court read its own
libertarian convictions into the Fourteenth Amendment under the guise of interpretation);
Paul J. Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949, 950 (1978)
(challenging the regularization of institutional decrees and the acceptance “that judges must
therefore act in a wholesale fashion to reform government to, bring about the ‘cure’ ”).
33 Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 30, at 1393–95.
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liability.34 Brennan’s revisionist legislative history was prompted
by the Court’s irreconcilable holdings that Monroe and its progeny
precluded municipal liability and that school boards could still be
sued under § 1983.35
At stake was the Court’s post-Brown v. Board of Education
desegregation project. In addition to citing “over a score of cases”36
in which the Court decided on school board liability and which sat
uncomfortably alongside Monroe,37 Brennan’s majority opinion
interpreted congressional actions to reflect legislative approval of
federal judicial supervision of local school districts, with some
costs paid by local governments.38
In his concurrence, Justice Lewis Powell more explicitly
characterized the school board and Monroe line of cases as
impossibly inconsistent.39 Powell observed that the Court had not
prohibited official-capacity school board cases that included
damages claims, thereby implicitly recognizing municipal damages
He also rejected proposals that would bifurcate
liability.40
municipal liability based on the nature of the requested relief and,

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.
Id. at 695–96 (explaining that cases decided before and after Monroe “holding school
boards liable in § 1983 actions are inconsistent with Monroe”).
36 Id. at 663, 663 n.5.
37 Id.
38 See id. at 696–99 (inferring legislative approval of municipal liability from, in part,
Congress’s rejection of efforts to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over school boards, its
provision of funds to assist school districts in complying with decrees, and its authorization
of civil rights attorney’s fees awards).
39 See id. at 710–11 (Powell, J., concurring) (“This line of cases—from Monroe to Kenosha—
is difficult to reconcile on a principled basis with a parallel series of cases in which the Court
has assumed sub silentio that some local government entities could be sued under § 1983.”);
see also id. at 711 (warning that maintaining Monroe’s holding would cast “grave doubt” on the
Court’s § 1983 school board litigation). Both in dissent and in memorandums, Justice
Rehnquist invoked stare decisis and disputed the inconsistency or “confusion” of Monroe and
the school board cases, contending that the lines of cases have made clear the distinction. See
id. at 714–17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court has reaffirmed Monroe’s
holding “on at least three separate occasions” and that “[t]oday, the Court abandons this long
and consistent line of precedents”); Rough Draft of Memorandum from Justice William H.
Rehnquist to the Conference regarding No. 76-1914, Monell v. Department of Social Services
7–8 (Mar. 6, 1978) (on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Archives, Washington and Lee
University School of Law), http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/powell%20archives/75-1914_Monell
_Dept.1978March.pdf (“In my opinion, the cases are in no confusion whatsoever as to whether
a municipal corporation is a ‘person’ for purposes of § 1983.”).
40 Monell, 436 U.S. at 711–12 (Powell, J., concurring).
34
35
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thus, permit only equitable claims under § 1983.41 Powell noted
the Court’s rejection of such a dual approach in Kenosha.42
Finally, Powell argued that expansion of municipal liability under
§ 1983 was necessary or else the Court’s recent Bivens cause of
action under the Fourteenth Amendment might have to be
broadened to encompass claims against local governments.43
The Court’s ambivalence toward municipal liability—
particularly its potential for solidifying and increasing
burdensome lawsuits and federal court supervision of local
government agencies that had been ushered in with Brown—helps
explain the compromised nature of Monell and its policy and
causation requirement. Indeed, the Court foreshadowed these
concerns two years earlier in its 1976 opinion, Rizzo v. Goode,
which struck down a court order requiring extensive Philadelphia
police department reforms.44 Rizzo emphasized the sensitivity
with which the Court regards federal injunctions against local
government, and demanded a direct causal link between a plan or
policy and unconstitutional conduct.45
Even though the Monell plaintiffs only sought back pay for their
unconstitutional department-imposed pregnancy leaves, the Court
adopted the very same rules for establishing liability articulated in
Rizzo.46 To better understand Monell, we must revisit Rizzo.
C. RIZZO V. GOODE

Rizzo is not, formally, a municipal liability case.47 But the
Rizzo litigation amounts to a municipal liability case in everything
but name. Individuals and groups on behalf of all Philadelphia
residents and black residents brought two consolidated class
Id. at 712.
Id.
43 Id.
44 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 365–66 (1976).
45 See id. at 377–80 (noting that “the principles of federalism . . . play such an important
part in governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments”).
46 See infra Part II.D.
47 To some extent Rizzo is simply a supervisory liability case in which the Court held that
officials could not be held liable under § 1983 unless they actually directed the constitutional
violation. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 384 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The Court today appears to
assert that a state official is not subject to the strictures of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he directs
the deprivation of constitutional rights.”).
41
42
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actions against the mayor, police commissioner, and other city
officials.48 The suits sought equitable remedies based on a
“pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by
police officers” targeting minorities but affecting all city
residents.49 The Court characterized the claims against the city
officials as alleging “express authorization or encouragement
of . . . mistreatment [and] failure to act in a manner so as to assure
that it would not recur in the future.”50
The trial concerned approximately forty incidents of alleged
police misconduct and entailed twenty-one days of hearings
consisting of approximately 250 witnesses.51 As relief, the district
court ordered a comprehensive program for addressing civilian
complaints—subject to guidelines on revising police manuals and
procedures concerning civilian interaction, including limits on
racial bias, offensive language, and searches—complaint
processing; forms; and adjudication of complaints.52
The Supreme Court’s decision presaged Monell’s policy
requirement for municipal liability. Writing for the 6–3 majority,
Justice William Rehnquist held the lower courts’ equitable relief
improper, rejecting liability based on a pattern of misconduct by
police officers because there was no showing of a causal link to the
The Court
defendants’ actions, i.e., policies or plans.53
distinguished the desegregation cases, Brown and Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), in
which school board members and administrators had been ordered

Id. at 364 n.1.
Id. at 366–67.
50 Id. at 367.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 369–70.
53 See id. at 375 (distinguishing this case from two prior cases in which liability was
founded upon a pattern of intimidation “flowing from a deliberate plan by the named
defendants”). The Court might have dispensed with the case on just one of the grounds that
it raised in its opinion. For example, the Court determined that the plaintiffs lacked
standing because the relief they sought was too “attenuated” given that they sought
changes in police procedures but had not named the police officers who might act unlawfully
against them due to inadequate guidance. Id. at 372 (“[T]he individual respondents’ claim to
‘real and immediate’ injury rests not upon what the named petitioners might do to them in
the future . . . but upon what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to
them in the future because of the unknown policemen’s perception of departmental
disciplinary procedures.”).
48
49
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to integrate schools because those officials had affirmatively
denied equal protection to minority students.54
The case came down to concerns over federalism and the scope
of the federal courts’ equitable power. Indeed, the Rizzo opinion
suggests that courts should be skeptical of claimants seeking
equitable relief under § 1983.55 The case was, in large measure,
about the role that courts should have in overseeing police
department operations56 or, as the Court later phrased it, whether
“[t]he scope of federal equity power . . . should be extended to the
fashioning of prophylactic procedures for a state agency designed
to minimize this kind of misconduct on the part of a handful of its
employees.”57 The Court held that the injunctive relief requiring a
revision of the police department’s manual on procedures relating
to civilians “was indisputably a sharp limitation on the
department’s ‘latitude in the “dispatch of its own internal
affairs.” ’ ”58 Focusing on the equitable nature of the relief, the
Court stressed the need to consider federalism in weighing the
propriety of the remedy.59 The Court ultimately held that the
district court’s injunctive decree had “departed from these
precepts” of federalism, which included restraining intrusion of
federal courts’ equitable powers into state administration of law.60
Dissenting, Justice Harry Blackmun agreed with the “abstract
principle” that federal judicial involvement in local police
operation is “undesirable,” but contended that § 1983 was intended
to cover inaction leading to the violation of constitutional rights.61
Id. at 376–77.
See id. at 378 (“Section 1983 by its terms confers authority to grant equitable relief as
well as damages, but its words ‘allow a suit in equity only when that is the proper
proceeding for redress . . . .’ ” (quoting Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903))).
56 See id. at 369 (noting that much of the argument in the proceedings below had been
“directed toward the proposition that courts should not attempt to supervise the functioning
of the police department” (quoting COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1320 (1973))).
57 Id. at 378.
58 Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
59 See id. at 378 (“Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked,
federal courts must be constantly mindful of the ‘special delicacy of the adjustment to be
preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.’ ”
(quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951))); see id. at 379 (“[A]ppropriate
consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and
scope of equitable relief.” (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975))).
60 Id. at 379–80 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
61 Id. at 381–82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54
55
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Just four years later in United States v. City of Philadelphia,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected
the federal government’s efforts to secure very similar reforms of
Relying in part on
the Philadelphia police department.62
federalism principles, the Third Circuit held that the United
States lacked standing to pursue claims enjoining Philadelphia
Police Department officials from committing systematic civil rights
violations.63 Philadelphia residents no longer had a judicial
remedy to stop their own police from brutalizing them.
D. REVISITING MONELL

Monell’s policy requirement for municipal liability, insisting on
a causal relationship between the constitutional violation and a
municipal policy, relied almost entirely on Rizzo. The Court cited
Rizzo for the proposition that liability hinges on causation and
“that Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such
causation was absent.”64 Brennan’s second draft of the opinion
relied even more heavily on Rizzo, employing it to illustrate the
principle that blame or fault of the local government must be
demonstrated in order to fall within the scope of § 1983.65 In a
draft footnote, Brennan quoted at length the Rizzo Court’s
language distinguishing the school boards’ roles in Swann and
Brown, and the emphasis on the affirmatively directed

United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 189–90 (3d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 189–90, 223 (noting that the Executive’s injunctive action compounds the threat
to local authority presented by the Fourteenth Amendment and the civil rights statutes).
64 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370–
71); see also id. at 694 n.58 (“By our decision in Rizzo v. Goode . . . we would appear to have
decided that the mere right to control without any control or direction having been
exercised and without any failure to supervise is not enough to support § 1983 liability.”
(citing Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370–71)); Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 370–71 (“The plain words of [§ 1983]
impose liability—whether in the form of payment of redressive damages or being placed
under an injunction—only for conduct which ‘subjects, or causes to be subjected’ the
complainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.”).
65 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., No. 75-1914, 2d Opinion Draft, Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr. at 33 n.59 (U.S. June 6, 1978) (on file with the Leon E. Bloch Law Library, University of
Missouri-Kansas City School of Law), http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justicepapers/monelldocs/T
M/Marshall%2004%20Monell%20(CF%20200-11%20PDF%20Files)/4-21-78%20Draft%20WJB
%202d%20Opinion%20TM200F110052.pdf (“For example, in Rizzo v. Goode . . . we recognized
that fault is a crucial factor in determining whether relief may run against a party for its
alleged participation in an unconstitutional tort.”).
62
63
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unconstitutional conduct in the desegregation cases.66 In order to
bring other Justices on board, however, Brennan sought to avoid
any appearance that negligence could establish municipal
liability.67 Brennan, therefore, removed all references to “fault”
throughout the opinion that would so imply, resulting in the
removal of the entire footnote and quote from Rizzo. Though the
Rizzo footnote was ultimately left on the cutting room floor, the
opinion’s imprint on Monell and municipal liability is
unmistakable.
What has received little attention is that the Rizzo
interpretation of § 1983, which Monell adopted, was predicated on
a case involving systemic injunctive relief—federal court
intervention in local policing efforts. In adopting the Rizzo test,
Monell also adopted Rizzo’s reasoning, namely its federalism
concerns, which are not always implicated by municipal liability
claims limited to damages relief.68
Id.
See Memorandum from William J. Brennan, Jr. to Lewis F. Powell regarding No. 751914, Monell v. Department of Social Services 1 (May 2, 1978) (on file with the Leon E. Block
Law Library, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law), http://www1.law.umkc.edu/
justicepapers/monelldocs/WJB/Brennan%2004%20Monell%20(CF%20I-437-7%20PDF%20File
s)/5-2-78%20Memo%20WJB%20to%20LFP%20WJB437F70067.pdf (“I have also gone through
Part II with care to remove the word ‘fault’ whenever it might, by negative implication,
indicate that we are creating a negligence cause of action under § 1983.”). Brennan also
agreed to remove any discussion of a potential deliberate indifference standard relating to a
constitutional duty to act, borrowed from Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), in order to
mollify some of the Justices, in particular Justices Stewart and Powell. See Memorandum
from Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to Justice Potter Stewart regarding No. 75-1914, Monell
v. Department of Social Services 2–3 (Apr. 25, 1978) (on file with the Leon E. Block Law
Library, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law), http://www1.law.umkc.edu/justi
cepapers/MonellDocs/TM/Marshall%2004%20Monell%20(CF%20200-11%20PDF%20Files)/4-2
5-78%20Memo%20WJB%20to%20PS%20TM200F110096.pdf (“I feel that I must qualify the
text . . . which would otherwise seem to foreclose a deliberate indifference theory. You may
differ with me on whether . . . deliberate indifference is ever enough to hold a city [liable], but
can’t we agree not to cut off either of our views in this case?”).
68 The Court was certainly conscious, however, of the potential financial impact on local
governments’ treasuries caused by lifting the bar on municipal liability. Transcript of Oral
Argument of Oscar G. Chase, Esq., on Behalf of Petitioners at 26–27, Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (No. 75-1914) (urging the Court to “think seriously about imposing
additional large substantial burden on governmental entities that are already strapped,
overburdened, finding it difficult to function”). Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Rehnquist
directly addresses the economic consequences on local governments’ treasuries of lifting the
bar on municipal liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 724 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he doctrine
of municipal immunity enunciated in Monroe has protected municipalities and their limited
treasuries from the consequences of their officials’ failure to predict the course of this Court’s
66
67
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The holdings of Rizzo cannot be separated from the underlying
facts of the case and, in particular, the relief sought. The Rizzo
majority formulated a rigorous causation standard for § 1983
liability based on facts that, as it perceived them, involved very few
allegations of misconduct, lacked authorization or approval of such
misconduct by defendants, and concerned a dispute between “the
entire citizenry of Philadelphia and the petitioning elected and
appointed officials” over police procedures.69 The sought-after relief
amounted to an “overhaul[ ]” of police policies and practices.70
David Jacks Achtenberg offers an alternative explanation of the
Monell outcome. Achtenberg contends that the Court’s municipal
liability doctrine was a compromise owing to Justice Powell’s
concern that “Monroe so severely imbalanced the structure of
federalism that he would be willing to overrule it despite his
normal concern for stare decisis.”71 Monell thus reifies Justice
Frankfurter’s seventeen-year-old dissenting viewpoint in Monroe
that liability should only follow where “the wrongdoer’s conduct
was actually authorized by state or local law.”72 Whether
municipal liability may be traced in part to Justice Frankfurter’s
“color of law” theory, Monell’s municipal liability holding
ultimately rests on case law—Rizzo—addressing structural reform
litigation and injunctive relief’s perceived departure from
“principles of federalism,”73 the effects of which are still felt today.
Even accepting my interpretation, Monell did in fact overrule
Monroe, permitting lawsuits against municipalities to go

constitutional jurisprudence.”); see also Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion, supra note 28, at
687 (describing the view that Monell was “an ad hoc political compromise” possibly “motivated
by concern about the perilous financial condition of some cities”).
69 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371.
Acknowledging the federalism concerns, Justice Blackmun
sought to minimize the remedy’s intrusive aspects. He contended that “[t]he remedy was
one evolved with the defendant officials’ assent.” Id. at 381 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 372–73 (majority opinion). The remedy, Justice Blackmun argued, was not overly
burdensome, was efficient, would improve the system, and would reduce constitutional
violations. See id. at 381 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71 Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion, supra note 28, at 693–94.
Peter Schuck less
charitably observes that the municipal liability “doctrine bore the unmistakable imprint of
bastardy; its supporting rationale suggests nothing so much as a split-the-difference judicial
compromise.” Peter H. Schuck, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: Some Lessons from
Tort Law and Organization Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 1753, 1755 n.13 (1989).
72 Achtenberg, Frankfurter’s Champion, supra note 28, at 682.
73 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 380.
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forward.74 Some of this may be attributable to the Court’s
necessary endorsement of judicially imposed desegregation. In
justifying its departure from Monroe and its ban on municipal
liability, the Court relied in part on the fact that school boards
were still held liable in desegregation litigation and that Congress
had continued to support this state of affairs.75
Monell also explicitly and implicitly embraces a municipal
liability remedy that encompasses all forms of relief. The Court
expressly stated that “[l]ocal governing bodies . . . can be sued
directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive
relief,”76 and the Court’s positive citation of federal school
desegregation decrees reflected additional approval of injunctive
relief.77 The Court’s opinion, however, is best viewed as both
theoretically endorsing the school board structural reform line of
cases, while also complicating future implementation of its holding
by designing such demanding policy or custom and causation
standards.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, all of whom had
dissented in Rizzo, might have considered relying on that opinion’s
high causation standard as a necessary concession for cobbling
together a majority in Monell. But the adoption of Rizzo as the
municipal liability standard makes Monell a pyrrhic civil rights
victory. Rizzo’s skepticism of federal court intervention, sounding
in federalism, looms over every municipal liability case, even when
federalism concerns are not significant or necessarily implicated.
E. CITY OF LOS ANGELES V. LYONS

The Court made clear its concern over municipal liability and
invasive equitable remedies when, in 1983, it struck down an
order enjoining the Los Angeles Police Department from
authorizing chokeholds.78 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons does not
explicitly address the contours of the causation policy standard. It
is, nominally, a case concerning standing for injunctive relief. Yet,

74
75
76
77
78

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
See id. at 696–99.
Id. at 690.
See id. at 696–97.
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 97–100 (1983).
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it elevates the pleading standard for equitable claims in contrast
to damages claims and echoes the federalism concerns expressed
in Rizzo, notwithstanding the less intrusive relief requested in
Lyons. As a result, it has significantly impacted the development
of municipal liability.
In Lyons, the Supreme Court addressed a suit for a preliminary
injunction against Los Angeles that sought to prohibit the Los
Angeles Police Department’s use of chokeholds except where a
suspect reasonably appeared to be an immediate and deadly
threat.79 Adolph Lyons alleged that, in connection with a traffic
stop and without any provocation, Los Angeles police placed him in
a chokehold that rendered him unconscious and damaged his
Lyons further alleged that city policy authorized
larynx.80
chokeholds where there was no threat of deadly force and that, as
a result of the application of these chokeholds, many people had
been injured.81 The Court ultimately overturned the injunction,
holding that Lyons lacked standing to bring the claim because his
injury did not evidence a “real and immediate threat” that he
would be stopped again by police and that they would unlawfully
choke him.82 In denying standing, the Court narrowly read
Lyons’s complaint, finding that his allegation that chokeholds
were authorized in less-than-deadly-force situations was not
sufficient to assert a policy of chokeholds without provocation.83
Lyons addresses arguments about whether the nature of the
relief requested should influence the Court’s legal analysis,
specifically its analysis of the case or controversy requirement.84
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach to determining
the existence of a federal case for equitable relief, which imposed
lesser standards in cases where discrete injunctive relief was
Id. at 98.
Id. at 97–98.
81 Id. at 98. Between the time of the complaint’s filing and the Court’s opinion, fifteen
people had died due to the chokehold technique. Id. at 100. The Board of Police
Commissioners then placed a six-month moratorium on the use of chokeholds except in
instances involving deadly threats. Id.
82 Id. at 105.
83 Id. at 106 n.7. Strictly construing the alleged policy, the Court found the possibility of
harm to Lyons remote because it would require that he be stopped by the police again and
that he either (1) illegally resist arrest or (2) that police again ignore orders and choke him
without instigation. Id. at 106.
84 Id. at 108.
79
80
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sought than the Court imposed in cases like Rizzo where massive
structural reform was pursued.85 Addressing equitable relief
standards, the Court maintained that courts should exercise
restraint in light of federalism concerns.86 But the Court also
applied a more exacting standing standard for equitable relief
than it did for damages relief.87
Justice Marshall took issue with the bifurcated approach.
Dissenting, he contended that the city’s chokehold policy should
suffice for purposes of both equitable and damages liability.88
Similar to the Ninth Circuit, Justice Marshall also argued that the
nature of the equitable relief should impact the federalism
assessment. He distinguished Lyons as a case involving only a
preliminary injunction concerning limited relief, whereas Rizzo
involved a permanent injunction instituting comprehensive
reforms.89
Lyons essentially closed the door on private civil lawsuits
seeking structural reform.90 Though not framed in terms of
§ 1983, the Court’s stringent case or controversy requirement for
injunctive relief could just as easily be replaced with Monell’s
See id. at 108–09.
See id. at 112 (noting that the availability of injunctive relief under § 1983 does “not
displace the normal principles of equity, comity, and federalism that should inform the
judgment of federal courts when asked to oversee state law enforcement authorities”).
87 Id. at 106 n.7, 108 (conservatively construing allegations of abusive chokeholds so as
not to find a policy that the Court terms “unbelievable” and questioning the “odds” that
plaintiffs would be subjected to unprovoked chokeholds by police).
88 Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Lyons . . . has standing to challenge the city’s
chokehold policy and to obtain whatever relief a court may ultimately deem appropriate.
None of our prior decisions suggests that his requests for particular forms of relief raise any
additional issues concerning his standing.”); id. at 122–23 (“[B]y fragmenting a single claim
into multiple claims for particular types of relief and requiring a separate showing of
standing for each form of relief, the decision today departs from this Court’s traditional
conception of standing and of the remedial powers of the federal courts.”); id. at 127 (“In
determining whether a plaintiff has standing, we have always focused on his personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy, not on the issues sought to be litigated . . . or the ‘precise
nature of the relief sought.’ ” (citations omitted)).
89 Id. at 133–34 (“The modest interlocutory relief granted in this case differs markedly,
however, from the intrusive injunction involved in Rizzo, and simply does not implicate the
federalism concerns that arise when a federal court undertakes to ‘supervise the functioning
of the police department.’ ” (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting))).
90 See Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 30, at 1386 (“We have
lost, in the post-Lyons world, the powerful force of the citizenry as a direct agent in effecting
meaningful social change through America’s courts.”).
85
86
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policy-causation requirement. Justice Marshall lamented that the
Lyons decision left victims of systematic police violence with “only
an award of damages.”91 Sadly, however, the Court’s subsequent
municipal liability jurisprudence renders Justice Marshall’s
comment overly optimistic.
F. MONELL’S LEGACY

Over the past thirty years, Monell’s promise of municipal
liability has proven to be a paper tiger. Since Monell the Court
has only developed a set of stricter requirements for establishing
municipal liability. David Jacks Achtenberg complains that the
doctrine’s exceedingly high and “idiosyncratically protective”
standards exceed those prescribed for private employers, negligent
selection of independent contractors, non-constitutional torts, and
even punitive damages against private employers.92 Peter Schuck
similarly criticizes the Court for unfaithfully and inconsistently
applying private tort law concepts to municipal liability.93 He also
takes to task the Court’s “official policy” test and causation
standards for failing to appreciate the invariable “causal nexus
between agency and injury.”94 Moreover, terms such as “policy”
and “policymaker” are so ill-defined as to “bear[ ] only a superficial
resemblance to the type of public agency at which § 1983 claims
are typically directed.”95
The Rizzo-influenced federalism concerns pervade the Court’s
opinions limiting municipal liability, notwithstanding the fact that
virtually all of these cases address only damages claims. In
addition, many of these cases echo Rizzo’s lingering dispute over
whether and when single instances of misconduct amount to a

Lyons, 461 U.S. at 137 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
David Jacks Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously: Municipal Liability Under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Debate Over Respondeat Superior, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2183, 2191
(2005) [hereinafter Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously]. Achtenberg traces the standards
to the Court’s concern for the “municipal pocketbook.” Id.
93 See Schuck, supra note 71, at 1763 (“[W]hile relying upon some of private law’s basic
concepts and policy justifications, the Court uses them in ways that bear little resemblance
to how they are applied in the private law settings from which they are derived.”).
94 Id. at 1764–65; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Liability Rule for Constitutional
Torts, 99 VA. L. REV. 207, 236 (2013) (characterizing the legal standard for identifying
official policy or custom as “radically indeterminate”).
95 Schuck, supra note 71, at 1775–78.
91
92
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systematic problem which could evince municipal liability.96 The
federalism-influenced debate over what amounts to a sufficiently
obvious or systematic problem suffuses the Court’s treatment of
“failure to train” and “failure to review” damages cases.97
In 1989, the Court held in City of Canton v. Harris that a local
government’s failure to train police officers on the use of deadly
force could establish municipal liability because violent encounters
are sufficiently predictable as to render a lack of training
deliberately indifferent.98 But as with Monell, the promise of
Harris is illusory. Relying on both Monell and Rizzo, the Harris
Court stressed the need for a significant standard of fault in
failure-to-train claims.99 A failure-to-train claim will only meet
the § 1983 “policy or custom” standard if it amounts to “deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained
employees] come into contact.”100 Thus, lack of training can only
be characterized as policy where the “need for more or different
training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city
can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the
need.”101
The Harris Court explained that a lesser standard would
violate Monell’s strictures, amounting to “de facto respondeat
superior liability.”102 The Court then cited Rizzo for its federalism
argument, contending that a lesser standard “would also engage
the federal courts in an endless exercise of second-guessing
municipal employee-training programs”—an exercise “the federal

96 See HOWARD M. WASSERMAN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 135 (2013)
(“The point of departure may be competing visions of whether constitutional cases typically
involve a ‘single incident of a lone officer’s misconduct’ or whether they really hide more
systemic and systematic misconduct.” (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 80 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting))).
97 Id. at 134 (noting that this debate is present “especially under the failure-to-[blank]
theory”).
98 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989).
99 See id. at 391–92 (establishing that failure-to-train claims “can only yield liability
against a municipality where the city’s failure to train reflects deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of its inhabitants”).
100 Id. at 388–89.
101 Id. at 390.
102 Id. at 392 (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693–94 (1978)).
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courts are ill suited to undertake”—and “would implicate serious
questions of federalism.”103
Eight years later, in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown,
the Court held that a county’s alleged failure to properly review an
applicant-deputy sheriff’s history could not render the county
liable for the deputy sheriff’s excessive force.104 The Court held
that a thorough background check would not have turned up
information suggesting the likelihood that he would use excessive
force during his employment.105 The lack of a causal connection
meant that the county was not deliberately indifferent to the risk
of a constitutional violation.106 Though no injunctive relief was
sought, the Court again adopted the mantle of protecting local
government autonomy from federal judicial intrusion: “A failure to
apply stringent culpability and causation requirements raises
serious federalism concerns, in that it risks constitutionalizing
particular hiring requirements that States have themselves
elected not to impose.”107
In the Court’s most recent, extensive discussion of municipal
liability in 2011, it held that the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s
Office was not liable for district attorneys’ failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence because of its failure to train them on the
relevant constitutional requirements.108 In Connick v. Thompson,
the Court found that, despite at least four Brady violations, the
risk of additional violations was not so great as to require
corrective action in the form of training regarding prosecutors’
disclosure obligations.109 In his concurrence, Scalia raised the
same Monell-respondeat superior liability and Rizzo-federalism

Id. (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378–80 (1976)).
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 415–16 (1997).
105 See id. at 412–14.
106 Id. at 415 (“Sheriff Moore’s hiring decision could not have been ‘deliberately indifferent’
unless in light of [respondent’s] record [respondent’s] use of excessive force would have been
a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision.”).
107 Id.
108 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 54 (2011).
109 See id. at 62–63 (explaining that four overturned convictions of prosecutors in
Connick’s office that resulted from Brady violations “could not have put Connick on notice
that the office’s Brady training was inadequate with respect to the sort of Brady violation at
issue here”).
103
104
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concerns over a lesser standard for holding municipalities liable
for failure to train.110
While case law continues to justify restrictions on individuals’
municipal liability claims for police abuses by invoking principles
of federalism, legislation has existed for almost a quarter-century
that affords the federal executive branch authority to pursue
injunctive relief against the same police departments and local
governments. Ironically, the latter authorities may raise greater
concerns over federalism than individual municipal liability
damages claims. More problematic, the statutory framework
insufficiently addresses the compensatory, democratic, procedural
justice, and civil recourse vacuum caused by the judicially imposed
limitation on municipal liability claims.
III. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURAL REFORM LITIGATION
Increased concern over police brutality—in particular the
beating of Rodney King and the resulting social unrest—and
appreciation that the courts effectively foreclosed § 1983 litigation
as a police reform tool impelled Congress to enact new legislation.
In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, which, in part, authorizes the Attorney
General to file a civil cause of action against local police agencies
when they engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
misconduct.111 Under the Act, the Justice Department may seek
declaratory and equitable relief, but not damages, to eliminate the
misconduct.112 Private litigants, however, are afforded no such
cause of action.113
See id. at 74 (Scalia, J., concurring).
See 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2012), reclassified as 34 U.S.C.A. § 12601 (Westlaw through
Pub. L. No. 115-90).
112 34 U.S.C.A. § 12601(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-68) (“[T]he Attorney
General . . . may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable or declaratory relief to
eliminate the pattern or practice.”).
113 Scholars have advocated analog private causes of action and Congress contemplated
amendments to similar effect. See, e.g., Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation,
supra note 30, at 1417–18 (proposing the authorization or deputization of private
individuals to bring injunctive lawsuits under § 14141, with the Justice Department
retaining authority to quash such lawsuits); Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police
Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3189, 3241–43 (2014) [hereinafter Rushin, Federal
Enforcement of Police Reform] (advocating a similar proposal); see also Law Enforcement
Trust and Integrity Act of 2000, H.R. 3927, 106th Cong. § 502 (2000) (proposing to amend
110
111
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Section 14141 advocates credit the law for important police
reforms.114 Section 14141 actions compel and foster institutional
changes that local entities would not otherwise implement for
political and economic reasons.115 These changes usually include
significant transparency and accountability mechanisms that lead
to sustained corrections of police misconduct.116 Reforms under
§ 14141 also may reduce future litigation costs related to police
abuses.117
From a federalism perspective, however, § 14141 and its
attendant systematic injunctive relief may raise more concerns
than individual damages lawsuits under § 1983. Structural
reform litigation under § 14141 entails significant federal
influence over local law enforcement policies and practices.
Stephen Rushin and Griffin Edwards characterize such federal
reforms as “the single most invasive form of external legal
regulation imposed on American police departments.”118
Currently, “nearly one in five Americans is served by a law
enforcement agency that has been subject to a Department of
§ 14141 by adding language that would allow “[a] person who is aggrieved by a violation of
subsection (a)” to bring a civil action to “obtain declaratory and injunctive relief with respect
to the violation”); Law Enforcement Trust and Integrity Act of 1999, H.R. 2656, 106th Cong.
§ 501 (1999) (same). For a critique of the proposed private right of action as deleterious to
police reform efforts, see Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive
Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 57–62 (2009) [hereinafter Harmon, Promoting Civil
Rights] (noting, among other things, that private suits under § 14141 “are ill-suited as a
means for achieving high-quality departmental reform”).
114 See, e.g., Sunita Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community
Engagement” Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 794–95
(2016) (discussing documentation of DOJ success in addressing police violence pursuant to
§ 14141); Stephen Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation in American Police Departments, 99
MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1359–63 (2015) [hereinafter Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation]
(discussing studies finding § 14141 to be effective at reducing police misconduct).
115 See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 114, at 1397–1404 (explaining
that structural reform litigation forces municipalities to allocate scarce resources to police
reform, even when such allocation may be democratically unpopular, and uses external
monitoring “to ensure that police agencies substantively comply with policy changes”).
116 See id. at 1404.
Some research suggests, however, that reforms may falter once
oversight and monitoring end under a consent decree. See id. at 1410–11 (noting one such
example concerning the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police that “provides a cautionary tale about
what can happen after external monitoring ends”).
117 See id. at 1410–11 (demonstrating that the number of civil rights suits brought against
the Pittsburgh police fell drastically during federal oversight of the Pittsburgh Bureau of
Police, but increased once federal oversight ended and a change of leadership occurred).
118 Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards, De-Policing, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 727 n.18
(2017).
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Justice (DOJ) investigation via § 14141.”119 As of 2016, the DOJ
has conducted sixty-one formal investigations and entered into
thirty-one settlement agreements with local entities, many of
which were subjected to ongoing federal oversight.120
The scope of § 14141 investigations, subsequent agreements,
and oversight is extensive. Most agreements, for example, require
reforming a range of police practices, including use-of-force
policies, reporting requirements, training, and internal
investigations.121 Agreements under § 14141 also result in lengthy
federal oversight of local police and high compliance standards,
with monitoring spanning five to twelve years.122
The costs of § 14141 reforms are also significant, and it is local
governments that must pay for the changes, pushing the increased
costs onto local taxpayers.123 Rushin estimates that Los Angeles,
for example, paid out over $100 million during the time of its
consent decree’s implementation and external monitoring.124
Though virtually all structural reforms are undertaken through
settlement agreements, § 14141 invariably entails federal coercion
in the form of highly public investigations or threatened
litigation.125 Section 14141 actions thus inevitably impose federal
priorities on local governmental discretion. The DOJ’s impact may
include requiring uniform changes that are not particularized to
Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 114, at 1347–48.
Rushin & Edwards, supra note 118, at 750; see also Rushin, Structural Reform
Litigation, supra note 114, at 1377 (noting that, since 1997, “the DOJ has agreed to a total
of 24 different settlements in 22 jurisdictions” and that “12 have resulted [in] full-scale
SRL, supervised by the DOJ through the appointment of an external monitor”).
121 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 114, at 1378. A few agreements also
directly address bias and race in local policing. Id. at 1385–86. Rushin and Edwards
contend that the wide scope and oversight arsenal under § 14141 makes local police more
likely to implement reforms than to respond to individual cases often addressing a discrete
procedural issue. Rushin & Edwards, supra note 118, at 750–52 (explaining that while
there is “real debate about whether police departments even make the substantive and
procedural reforms demanded by court cases,” DOJ intervention “seems to bring about real,
procedural and substantive changes to affected police departments”).
122 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 114, at 1391–92, 1392 fig.5.
123 Id. at 1392–93.
124 Id. at 1393.
125 See id. at 1399–1400 (“When local political actors are unwilling to make the necessary
investments in police reform, SRL uses the threat of equitable relief under § 14141 to force
the reallocation of scarce resources in a way that no other regulatory mechanism can.”);
Rushin & Edwards, supra note 118, at 728, 746 (noting the “intense public scrutiny” caused
by investigations).
119
120
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local needs,126 “forc[ing] municipalities to prioritize investments
into police reform over other municipal goals”—which may be at
odds with the community’s preferences127—and altering local
government leadership.128
In addition, some scholars contend that while the § 14141
reform process may address and improve system-wide police
abuses, it also disrupts local communities and their relationships
with police. Rushin and Edwards argue that “public § 14141
investigations are destabilizing incidents within targeted
communities that expose the affected police departments to added
public distrust and negative interactions.”129 They also contend
that § 14141 reforms have led to crime increases as a result of less
aggressive and efficient policing.130
Moreover, the § 14141 “pattern or practice” liability standard
appears far more capacious—at least in practice—than the § 1983
liability requirements. Indeed, the DOJ and some commentators
believe § 14141 operates as a strict liability regime, requiring only
the demonstration of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional
conduct to justify declaratory or equitable relief from local
governments and police departments.131 As a result, state and

126 See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 114, at 1378 (“While each
negotiated settlement should be specifically tailored to the unique needs of the individual
municipality, the settlements have proven to be remarkably similar over time.”).
127 See id. at 1397–1400 (explaining that structural reform litigation forces municipalities
to allocate scarce resources to police reform, “even when doing so may not be democratically
popular”).
128 Id. at 1400.
129 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 118, at 753.
130 See id. at 758–59 (finding that the introduction of § 14141 regulation was associated
with a statistically significant uptick in some crime rates relative to unaffected
municipalities, but that this uptick was concentrated in the years immediately after federal
intervention and diminished over time); see also Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation,
supra note 114, at 1412–13 (noting that while various critics have claimed that federal
intervention into the affairs of municipalities has led to de-policing, evidence for this
hypothetical is limited).
131 See United States’ Brief Regarding Municipal Liability at 1-2, United States v. Town of
Colorado City, No. 3:12-cv-8123-HRH, 2017 WL 1384353 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2017) (arguing
that the only requirement for establishing liability of a governmental authority under
§ 14141 is a showing of “a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct by law
enforcement officers”); see also Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 113, at 60
(noting that “Section 14141’s strict liability standard . . . makes a department liable so long
as a pattern or practice of misconduct exists in the department”).
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local governments and police departments fall easily under federal
court jurisdiction and oversight.
For example, the DOJ argued in 2016 structural reform
litigation against two Colorado towns that the municipalities
should be found liable for their police officers’ pattern or practice of
unconstitutional violations “without any additional showing of
municipal liability.”132 The DOJ contended that § 1983 liability
standards should not apply to § 14141 actions because the latter
(1) did not focus on individual conduct, but on systemic violations
and (2) did not provide a damages remedy, but only declaratory
and equitable relief.133 Because virtually all local police entities
have bowed to federal pressure and entered settlement
agreements and consent decrees, few courts have addressed the
DOJ’s strict liability argument.134 In light of the comparatively
low threshold for § 14141 actions, the federal government can
easily entangle itself in local policing matters affecting wide
swaths of law enforcement, leadership, and municipal finances for
long periods of time.
Notwithstanding the powerful and ready tool that is structural
reform litigation under § 14141, resources and politics limit its
more widespread application. And these constraints may diminish
federalism concerns.135 First, federal resources cannot be utilized
to address all 18,000 local police agencies throughout the
country.136 While § 14141 reform efforts often focus on some of the
United States’ Brief Regarding Municipal Liability, supra note 131, at 1.
Id. at 2–3.
134 The only court that reached the § 14141 liability issue rejected the DOJ’s differentiated
standards argument. See United States v. City of Columbus, No. 2:99-cv-1097, 2000 WL
1133166, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2000) (holding that the § 1983 municipal liability
standard applies to § 14141 claims). Few jurisdictions have resisted entering settlement
agreements under § 14141. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 3d 272, 354
(M.D.N.C. 2015) (holding that the DOJ failed to establish a pattern or practice of
constitutional violations).
135 John Jeffries, Jr. and George Rutherglen contend that § 14141 does not raise the same
issues of “interference with state and local government” as individual-plaintiff-initiated
lawsuits because federal orders “obtained by federal officials involve some degree of political
accountability in the decision to sue and to seek structural relief.” John C. Jeffries, Jr. &
George A. Rutherglen, Structural Reform Revisited, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1421 (2007).
136 Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 114, at 1415–16 (noting that a
“potential drawback of § 14141 is that the federal government simply lacks the resources
necessary for aggressive enforcement” and that, “given that there are around 18,000 local
and state police agencies in the United States, the likelihood that any one agency will be
subject to federal intervention . . . appears to be relatively low”).
132
133
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largest U.S. cities, thereby impacting a substantial portion of the
public,137 the vast majority of police departments escape federal
scrutiny and management.138
Second, federal political prerogatives dictate how frequently the
DOJ employs its § 14141 authorities. The Clinton and Obama
Administrations pursued far more § 14141 actions than did the
Bush Administration.139 And early in its term, the Trump
Administration expressed disdain for § 14141 actions, criticizing
the use of such authority as inimical to federalism principles.140
Section 14141 police reform—and the attendant federal
intrusion—will therefore fluctuate with political priorities.
Though political- and resource-driven concerns may limit
federal interference in local policing, § 14141 may more squarely
implicate the federalism concerns that the Supreme Court raised
in Monell and its progeny over § 1983 municipal liability claims.
Indeed, the massive police department reforms undertaken
through § 14141 appear to outpace the systemic changes addressed
in Rizzo and United States v. Philadelphia.141
While § 14141 has been an important tool in addressing police
abuses, it is an imperfect solution to the municipal liability lacuna.
First, the differing political agendas and resource constraints that
may render § 14141 less offensive to federalism concerns limit its
utility as a tool for consistently combatting pervasive police
misconduct. Second, § 14141 fails to address procedural justice
and local concerns that may be realized through a properly
construed and applied § 1983. Section 14141’s usage brings both
attention and some improvement to systemic problems in local

137 Id. at 1415 (noting that the DOJ has “seemingly prioritized the investigation of major
police agencies that serve large swaths of the American population” in order to compensate
for its lack of resources).
138 Rushin & Edwards, supra note 118, at 750, 750 n.144 (“99.7% of American law
enforcement agencies have not been subject to DOJ intervention or investigation via
§ 14141.”).
139 See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 114, at 1371–72, 1372 fig.2
(noting that “the volume of SRL cases fell during the second Bush Administration” because
of “a variety of changes in the internal policies of the DOJ that discouraged the use of
federal oversight in reforming local state agencies”).
140 See Sessions Memo, supra note 19, at 1 (“It is not the responsibility of the federal
government to manage non-federal law enforcement agencies.”).
141 See supra notes 55–63 and accompanying text.
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policing, but the changes are often top-down solutions lacking
community engagement and input.142
Several scholars have proposed amending § 14141 to authorize
actions for equitable and injunctive relief by private attorneys
general to address the law’s lack of local representation and
agency.143 Though laudable, these statutory reforms might subject
individual-initiated suits to DOJ approval and impede federal
officials’ own reform efforts.144
Finally, even if viewed as an adjunct to § 1983, § 14141 aids
only § 1983’s deterrence goal and provides no compensation for
victims. As a result, a strange system of bifurcated municipal
liability emerges when it comes to police misconduct—one that
permits selective and limited government-initiated, systemic
injunctive relief claims to flow readily, but practically bans
individual victims’ discrete damages claims.145 The next part
accordingly proposes that damages claims against municipal
entities should be held to a lesser standard of proof.
142 See Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 879 (2001) [hereinafter Gilles, In Defense
of Making Government Pay] (“A regime that forces community leaders—particularly in
minority communities—to come hat in hand to federal officials seeking protection of their
civil rights is at cross purposes with a zeitgeist that encourages community empowerment
and everywhere looks to roll back reliance upon government.” (quoting Gilles, Reinventing
Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 30, at 1425)); Gilles, Reinventing Structural
Reform Litigation, supra note 30, at 1387 (noting that the primacy of § 14141 in structural
reform of police practices ignores “the eyes, experiences, motivation, and resources of
millions of Americans who bear witness to institutionalized wrongdoing and are willing to
endure the expense of rooting it out”); Patel, supra note 114, at 799–800 (observing that
“community engagement, with little exception, has largely fallen short of advocates’ and
harmed communities’ expectations for reform” and describing “ways in which communities
have felt marginalized in the DOJ’s efforts to reform police departments”).
143 See, e.g., Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 30, at 1417–18
(proposing an amendment allowing the Justice Department “to authorize or deputize
private individuals to bring ‘pattern or practice’ suits where the government has
declined . . . to do so itself”); Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, supra note 17, at 482
(endorsing Gilles’s proposal and adding that she “would allow prevailing plaintiffs bringing
pattern and practice claims to recover attorneys’ fees under Section 1988 as an additional
incentive”).
144 Rachel Harmon questions whether private suits would aid § 14141 reforms, arguing
that they may be ineffective if litigated alone and may interfere with federal investigations
and lawsuits. See Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 113, at 57–62.
145 Recognizing the federalism concerns that § 14141 actions trigger, John Parry proposes a
more lenient injunctive relief standard under § 1983 (moving back from Lyons) in order to
achieve institutional corrections. John T. Parry, Judicial Restraints on Illegal State Violence:
Israel and the United States, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 73, 116–21 (2002).
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IV. A DISTINCT AND LENIENT MUNICIPAL LIABILITY DAMAGES
STANDARD
Premised on the revisionist account that what initially
animated the Court’s stringent causation standards for municipal
liability was concern over intrusive injunctive relief, I argue here
that relief under § 1983 should be bifurcated; specifically, that
municipal liability claims for damages relief merit a diminished
standard of proof. Even if one does not accept the revisionist
account of Monell, the functional argument is similar: the discrete
and retrospective nature of damages does not raise the same
federalism concerns as equitable relief’s prospective and often
invasive reforms. Moreover, historical skepticism of injunctive
relief—independent of municipal liability—argues for distinct
standards.
Finally, the lesser standard should facilitate
compensation to victims, buttress the public’s faith in the legal
system, ensure some vindication of constitutional rights, and
properly affix responsibility for police misconduct.
A. THE HISTORICAL AND PRACTICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DAMAGES AND INJUNCTIVE AND EQUITABLE RELIEF

Historically, injunctions were viewed as extraordinary relief, to
be used “sparingly” even in disputes between private parties.146
Unless a remedy at law proved inadequate, an equitable remedy
was not available. These general principles of equitable restraint
apply with even greater force where federal courts are asked to
enjoin state or local government actions.147 Several scholars
contend that, given the “historic relationship” between law and
equity, “damages should be at least as available as injunctions, if
not more.”148
146 Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10, 33 (1850); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362,
378 (1976).
147 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 379–80.
148 See, e.g., John F. Preis, In Defense of Implied Injunctive Relief in Constitutional Cases,
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3 (2013) (addressing implied constitutional actions and
noting that “[t]o arrange the doctrine differently ‘gets the traditional interplay between law
and equity exactly backwards’ ” and that “[i]f the Court is to respect history, therefore, it
should dramatically increase the availability of implied constitutional damages” (quoting
Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117,
1135 (1989))). John Preis acknowledges that the Court could—instead of extending
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Law has long recognized that the mode of redress affects how to
assess responsibility or blameworthiness. The distinct civil and
criminal regimes, for example, with their differing methods of
accountability (e.g., damages v. imprisonment) influence the
burdens of proof (e.g., preponderance of the evidence v. beyond a
reasonable doubt).
The import of a criminal conviction—
deprivation of liberty, moral opprobrium, stigma—justifies
requiring greater proof of misconduct than do the trappings of civil
penalties such as fines. Even in a unitary regime like § 1983,
then, different remedies should reasonably dictate the standards
by which courts review government actor misconduct.
By their very nature, damages do not usually entail judicial
interference in government action in the same disruptive manner
as equitable and injunctive relief.
Damages are generally
retrospective, discrete, measurable, and predictable. Equitable
and injunctive remedies are frequently prospective, indefinite,
indeterminate, and often wide-ranging. Unlike injunctive relief,
courts may also fashion damages remedies at some point removed
from emergent events, usually after obtaining significant
information.149 In determining a damages remedy, courts may
therefore “exercise such judicial virtues as calm reflection and
dispassionate application of the law to the facts.”150 The current
state of police misconduct litigation under § 1983 and § 14141,
however, inverts the law and equity relationship, paying little
heed to its historical antecedents and practical application.

damages availability—“withdraw the easy availability of injunctive actions, thus making
them harder to obtain than damages actions.” Id. at 4. It could be argued that, in Lyons,
the Court returned to a more traditional approach to address claims of relief by treating
prospective remedies more skeptically than damages, albeit through the standing doctrine
rather than under § 1983 causation standards. But this argument ignores the inapposite
equitable relief-influenced federalism concerns that suffuse the Monell causation
requirement to begin with, resulting in an inappropriately high causation burden as the
floor. See supra Parts II.D, II.F.
149 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1884 (2017) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (addressing
the availability of a Bivens damages remedy for conditions of confinement after the
September 11th terrorist attacks, Justice Breyer notes that courts are more likely to defer
to government action during emergencies, making a damages remedy all the more vital in
securing some accountability for government excesses).
150 Id.
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B. THE IMPORTANCE OF MUNICIPAL DAMAGES FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
TORTS

Enabling local government and police department liability for
damages for constitutional violations is critical to ensuring police
accountability. A viable monetary remedy against municipalities
for police brutality affords a modicum of compensation to victims,
restores public trust in the law, develops legal rights, and assigns
moral blame.
1. Compensation and Motivation. It is entirely possible that
not enough people sue police departments. According to the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, in 2002 only 7.3% of people who
believed the police used improper force against them ever filed a
lawsuit.151 At the most basic level, a broadened municipal liability
damages remedy should result in more lawsuits and more money
in victims’ pockets.152 The potentially lacking deterrent effect
should not necessarily detract from a diminished liability
standard’s legitimacy when it compensates a victim of a
constitutional violation.153
While plaintiffs may have any number of reasons for suing a
municipality, money may motivate them to endure the temporal,
financial, and psychological costs of litigation.154 Financial
compensation is a vital element of a tort system, whether one takes
a damages-as-indemnification or a damages-as-redress approach.155
151 See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC: FINDINGS FROM THE 2002 NATIONAL
SURVEY 16–20 (2005).
152 Undoubtedly, other factors explain people’s reluctance to sue over excessive police force.
Daniel Meltzer suggests that many victims’ interactions with the police are as “suspects or
defendants” and that they may not sue because of “ignorance of their rights, poverty, fear of
police reprisals, or the burdens of incarceration.” Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional
Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys
General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 284 (1988) (footnotes omitted). Other injuries may not merit
litigation because they are “small, widely dispersed, and intangible.” Id.
153 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
408 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Damages as a traditional form of compensation for
invasion of a legally protected interest may be entirely appropriate even if no substantial
deterrent effects on future official lawlessness might be thought to result.”).
154 Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, supra note 17, at 451 (observing that plaintiffs’
motivations in a damages lawsuit may involve several objectives: “to punish individual
defendants, to reform law enforcement, to have their day in court, or to get paid”).
155 Wells, supra note 5, at 1036–37 (noting that loss allocation is integral to the Court’s
understanding of tort law).
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And in many instances, other constitutional rights remedies—be
they protective, in the form of suppression, or prospective, styled as
an injunction—may not be available.156 Lifting the constraints on
municipal liability should prod more people to seek retrospective
money damages for constitutional violations.
2. Trust and Procedural Justice. Police abuse and lack of
accountability—civil and criminal—can easily erode people’s
respect for, and allegiance to, legal institutions.157 Enabling more
individual lawsuits seeking damages from local governments to
proceed to trial may combat these ill effects by instilling greater
public trust in the legal system. An easier municipal damages
lawsuit process also achieves an important degree of public
community engagement and empowerment.
Tom Tyler’s procedural justice studies find that people’s
perceptions of the fairness of judicial proceedings significantly
influence their acceptance of decisions and respect for the legal
system.158 Moreover, the influence of fair procedures does not vary
based on people’s racial, ethnic, and socio-economic background.159
Heightened municipal liability standards fail to meet a core
procedural justice principle—voice. “Having an opportunity to
voice their perspective has a positive effect upon people’s
experience with the legal system irrespective of their outcome, as
long as they feel that the authority sincerely considered their
arguments before making their decision.”160 Simply put, a more
generous standard ensures that the victim “feels heard.”161

156 See id. at 1051–52; see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 410 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“For
people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”).
157 See Mike Hough et al., Procedural Justice, Trust, and Institutional Legitimacy,
4 POLICING: J. POL’Y & PRAC. 203, 205 (2010) (“If the police abuse their powers and wield
their authority in unfair ways, this cannot only damage people’s sense of obligation to obey
their directives . . . it can also damage public perceptions of their moral authority and
therefore the moral right of the law to dictate appropriate behaviour.”); Walter
Katz, Enhancing Accountability and Trust with Independent Investigations of Police Lethal
Force, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 235, 237 (2015) (noting that the legitimacy of police agencies
“crumbles when civilians are treated unfairly and the public is left with the conclusion that
police agencies are not accountable”).
158 Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Courts, 44 CT. REV. 26, 26–27 (2007–2008).
159 Id. at 28.
160 Id. at 30.
161 Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 511 n.37
(2012).
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Permitting more victims to participate in damages actions
against their respective governments and police departments—
even if they ultimately lose—improves “perceptions of the
legitimacy of the system and about the [adjudication] process.”162
Allowing more cases to extend beyond motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment enables victims to “publicly
present their stories and have them ‘authenticated,’ create a public
record of the events, and have their cases decided by a jury.”163
These lawsuits also may become civic opportunities for public
engagement and education on government misconduct and
reform—regardless of the lawsuit’s outcome.164 They also may
provide autonomy and agency to some of a community’s most
marginalized population.165
3. Vindicating Constitutional Rights. Increasing damages
liability exposure for municipalities may be justified under civil
recourse theory. As opposed to the traditional tort rationale,
which emphasizes indemnification, “the civil recourse principle
holds that the point of tort law should be to empower the plaintiff
to exact redress for wrongs.”166 Compensation is certainly part of
the tort action’s objective. But along with a victim’s losses, a factfinder should consider “the character of the defendant’s
conduct, . . . and the power dynamic between the parties.”167
Michael Wells argues that the constitutional tort context
especially merits application of civil recourse principles.168
Obtaining a damages remedy—or at least a hearing in court—
162 Id.; see also Tyler, supra note 158, at 26 (explaining that litigants “accept ‘losing’ more
willingly if the court procedures used to handle their case are fair”).
163 Deseriee A. Kennedy, Processing Civil Rights Summary Judgment and Consumer
Discrimination Claims, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 989, 996 (2004).
164 See id. (“Furthermore, the educating function of public litigation is reduced when
claims are dismissed prematurely.”).
165 See Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay, supra note 142, at 879 (criticizing
dependence on federal officials under § 14141 as being “at cross purposes with a zeitgeist
that encourages community empowerment” (quoting Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform
Litigation, supra note 30, at 1425)).
166 Wells, supra note 5, at 1009.
Michael Wells traces the Court’s animosity towards
government constitutional tort liability to a tort theory focused on indemnification and
allocation of losses. See id. at 1005–07 (discussing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258–59
(1978), and Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986)).
167 John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 437 (2006).
168 See Wells, supra note 5, at 1012–13.
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against a governmental entity for constitutional violations is more
compelling than in the private tort context “because the rights
asserted are more vital and the defendants from whom redress is
sought are more powerful and more dangerous.”169 Indeed, the
very purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and Bill of Rights is to
protect the people from government abuse.170
Civil recourse should permit more constitutional tort lawsuits
to get through the courthouse doors without bankrupting local
governments. The focus on vindicating constitutional rights
makes it harder “to justify rules that foreclose plaintiffs from
obtaining” damages at all.171 Civil recourse theory, therefore,
dictates a departure from the Monell-driven heightened municipal
liability standards for damages.172 But because the primary
objective of civil recourse is to redress constitutional wrongs, a
damages award need not always provide full compensation for
actual losses.173 Civil recourse thus affords fact-finders a good deal
of flexibility in reaching damages calculations as they consider the
varying equities and policy considerations often attendant to
constitutional litigation.174 Legislators might similarly consider
incorporating limits on damages in connection with reduced
liability standards.
Other scholars have advocated making it easier to obtain relief
for certain constitutional torts through presumed or nominal
damages. Jean C. Love contends that presumed damages are the
only means for adequately compensating “the infringement of
constitutionally protected intangible interests.”175 She proposes
that victims of procedural due process violations, for example,

Id. at 1012.
Id.
171 Id. at 1008.
172 See id. at 1052–54 (explaining how civil recourse theory helps to solve the problem of a
general under-enforcement of constitutional norms that typically depend on tort suits for
enforcement).
173 Id. at 1036.
174 See id. at 1034 (noting that the reality of constitutional litigation is that other factors
beyond making the plaintiff whole have “considerable influence on remedial doctrine”); see
also id. at 1054 (“[C]ivil recourse consistently and broadly favors at least some vindication
of constitutional rights and some redress of constitutional wrongs.”).
175 Jean C. Love, Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional Rights, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 1242, 1282 (1979). Love also advocates permitting punitive damages against
municipalities. See id. at 1277–78.
169
170
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should not have to prove actual damages, as is the case with
dignitary torts such as defamation.176 Under such a legislatively
crafted regime, victims would be able to recover a liquidated sum,
guaranteeing a minimum amount, or to recover within a range,
from which the court could determine the appropriate award.177
Love also acknowledges that a more lenient standard of proof of
damages would at least facilitate better compensation for
constitutional torts victims.178
Advocates of more readily awarding nominal damages argue
that such relief will facilitate judicial vindication of constitutional
rights because courts will not be deterred by concern over the
remedy’s financial impact.179 As several critics have noted,
however, the lack of sufficient monetary relief may fail to motivate
plaintiffs to sue and, therefore, may prevent sufficient
development and protection of constitutional rights.180
4. Affixing Responsibility. Less restrictive municipal liability
standards for damages also may better approximate a local
government’s actual responsibility for constitutional violations.
Myriam Gilles praises municipal liability principally for its “faultGilles, however, criticizes government
fixing function.”181

176 See id. at 1261 (contending that “the intangible constitutional interests protected by
the procedural due process clause more closely resemble the dignitary interests protected by
such tort actions as defamation, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy”).
177 Id. at 1284.
178 Id. at 1281–82.
179 See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional
Tort Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1607–08 (2011) [hereinafter
Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma] (proposing that suits for nominal
damages should entitle plaintiffs to “immunity-free determination of their constitutional
claims”); Smith, supra note 1, at 483–84 (addressing the nominal damages approach for
local governments).
180 See, e.g., Love, supra note 175, at 1272 (contending that nominal damages do not serve
the purposes of compensation, deterrence, and vindication because the one-dollar award
makes it unlikely that plaintiffs will “initiate constitutional tort litigation to recover
nominal damages alone”). In fact, Love argues that the small amount of an award of
nominal damages may “more often have the symbolic effect of diminishing the legitimacy of
the plaintiff’s complaint.” Id. at 1281. Pfander acknowledges the concerns over motivation
and even suggests that nominal damages could foster greater judicial hostility toward
compensatory relief and reduce the number of claims against higher officials. Pfander,
Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma, supra note 179, at 1634–36.
181 Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay, supra note 142, at 863; see also Amato v.
City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 317–18 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The ability to promote an
individual official’s ‘scrupulous observance’ of the Constitution is important. Perhaps even
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indemnification of individual officers for their constitutional
violations because it fails to apportion blame or deter and reform
First, indemnification is generally a
police misconduct.182
contractually-bargained benefit, predating a constitutional
Thus, payouts are unlikely to compel local
violation.183
governments to seriously assess department culpability, and
government leaders will regard them as the “costs of doing
business.”184 Second, indemnification allows local governments to
“deflect[ ] attention from systemic and institutional factors
contributing to recurring constitutional deprivations” by focusing
on only the bad cops.185
Municipal liability, on the other hand, Gilles contends, “makes it
more difficult to take refuge in the ‘bad apple theory’ and more
likely that the municipality will take steps to remedy the broader
problems.”186 Apart from economic motivations, municipal liability
is more likely to publicly shame local governments as well as expose
information through discovery that may be beyond the scope of
Extolling municipal liability’s
individual officer lawsuits.187
“predictable and salutary effects” on police misconduct,188 Gilles
proposes broadening liability to encompass “customs” that local
police ignore and tacitly encourage.189
more important to society, however, is the ability to hold a municipality accountable where
official policy or custom has resulted in the deprivation of constitutional rights.”).
182 See Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay, supra note 142, at 862–63 (noting
that municipal liability incurred indirectly, through the indemnification of individual
officers, does not trigger the “fault-fixing function,” as it “does not necessarily force policymakers to acknowledge municipal fault and take remedial action”).
183 See id. at 862 (“The determination to indemnify is made at the front end, as the product
of collective bargaining arrangements . . . and not in response to any constitutional claim.”).
184 Id.
185 Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section
1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 31 (2000) [hereinafter Gilles, Breaking the
Code of Silence].
186 Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay, supra note 142, at 863.
187 See id. at 859–60 (arguing that municipal liability claims are “particularly well tailored
to the discovery of information concerning the cultural and political forces that give rise
to . . . police misconduct” and that with such discovery comes publicity that is capable of
inducing institutional change).
188 Id. at 867.
189 See id. at 867–68 (asserting that as the true range of actionable customs that may
support the imposition of municipal liability is recognized—particularly those
institutionalized, unwritten customs that underlie many of the constitutional deprivations
committed by police—“we will see more clearly the deterrent or behavior-altering effect of
constitutional damage suits aimed at municipalities under Monell”); see also Gilles, supra note
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Peter Schuck also would reduce standards for municipal
liability to better align with private tort conceptions of
responsibility and to more accurately reflect how local government
causes unlawful behavior.190 First, Schuck argues, the “local
government’s nexus to the violation” should often “satisfy both the
cause-in-fact and proximate cause criteria, as those concepts are
understood in private tort law.”191 Putting aside vicarious liability,
the government’s relationship to the government worker who
commits the violation amounts to “plac[ing] her in a position in
which the violation is possible, perhaps (on some facts) even
probable.”192 Second, the local government operates a monopoly
over services like policing and, thus, undertakes “special moral
obligations to perform them in socially beneficial ways.”193 Finally,
“risk-creating” endeavors such as policing merit liability just as
would a similarly hazardous private enterprise.194 The reduced
damages standards for municipalities thus cohere with a more
realistic, but moral, comprehension of local government
responsibility for police abuse.
A more permissive municipal damages liability standard also
should address the interdependent weaknesses of qualified
immunity.195 Victims of police officer abuse may be left with no
one to hold accountable because of the government-favoring biases
of both immunity doctrines. Yet, concerns over unfairly penalizing
officers when a constitutional right’s clarity is lacking have some

185, at 21–22 (“ ‘Custom’ claims for municipal liability . . . have the potential to address a wide
spectrum of recurring unconstitutional conduct on the part of low-level officials that simply go
unaddressed by current law.”). Gilles also would subject local governments to punitive
damages for “systemic and widespread” constitutional violations. Gilles, In Defense of Making
Government Pay, supra note 142, at 873.
190 Schuck, supra note 71, at 1764–65 (noting that “some causal nexus between agency
and injury almost invariably exists as a factual matter”).
191 Id. at 1779.
192 Id. The government has “authorized (perhaps mandated), supervised, trained,
equipped, and paid the individual who causes injury.” Id. Schuck also argues that the real
question in most § 1983 cases in which the municipality’s link to the injury is at issue is not
whether a causal nexus exists, but whether the municipality has a legal duty—a concept
that has been generally expanded in private law. Id. at 1764–66.
193 Id. at 1780.
194 Id.
195 See Smith, supra note 1, at 478 (“[B]ecause immunities for government agents and
immunities for local entities often work in tandem to block constitutional accountability, the
optimal approach to adjudicating constitutional torts should take this synergy into account.”).
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force. The doctrine goes too far, however, when officers may deny
the clarity of a prohibition despite their own department’s policy
guidance banning the misconduct at issue.196
As I have argued elsewhere, qualified immunity doctrine should
be changed to encompass local department policies as evidence of
“clearly established” rights.197 As a necessary complement to that
move, I propose in Part V that municipalities should be subject to
damages liability where a person suffers injury because a
municipality lacks policies that, according to national consensus,
are necessary to prevent constitutional violations.198 These fixes
should better approximate actual individual officer liability. The
delineation of responsibility may also encourage departments to
better develop and adopt appropriate police policies.
C. RESPONSES TO A BIFURCATED RELIEF-BASED REGIME

The following discussion addresses possible objections to
bifurcating relief, most of which are grounded in the Court’s § 1983
and immunity jurisprudence. The section also focuses on potential
legislative history arguments against a bifurcated model.
1. Undifferentiated Relief-Based Approach to § 1983. The
Supreme Court has not embraced a bifurcated relief-based
approach to § 1983 claims. The Court has generally treated claims
against municipalities the same regardless of whether the relief
sought is monetary or equitable. Certainly, the language of § 1983
does not distinguish between the modes of relief: “Every
person . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”199
Two years after Monroe, in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, the Court
declined to apply differing liability standards based on the relief
requested. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist explained,
“We find nothing in the legislative history discussed in Monroe, or
in the language actually used by Congress, to suggest that the
generic word ‘person’ in § 1983 was intended to have a bifurcated
196 See Cover, supra note 3, at 1824–31 (arguing that “it should work no hardship” to hold
officers accountable for violations of their own department’s use of force policies that reflect
the constitutional prohibition on excessive force).
197 Id. at 1824.
198 See supra Part V.A.
199 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of
the relief sought against them.”200
Justice Douglas, the author of Monroe, contended in his partial
dissent that the opinion had foreclosed only monetary relief
Douglas’s
against local government, not equitable relief.201
legislative historical account of § 1983—revised and overruled by
Monell—attributed Congress’s rejection of the Sherman
Amendment to the destructive and paralyzing effect of damages on
municipalities.202 But Monell, which addressed what, in practice,
were monetary claims, overruled Monroe’s bar on municipal
liability, yet clarified that it did not disturb the Monroe-progeny’s
holding that § 1983 applied equally to both equitable and
monetary claims for relief.203
Finally, in 2010, the Court unanimously held in Los Angeles
County v. Humphries that Monell’s “causation requirement” applies,
regardless of whether the plaintiffs seek damages or equitable
relief.204 The Court rejected the argument that claims for injunctive
relief should not be subject to the “policy or custom” requirement of
claims for damages. As the Court explained, “whether an action or
omission is a municipality’s ‘own’ has to do with the nature of the
action or omission, not with the nature of the relief that is later
sought in court.”205 The Court stressed that Monell’s causation
requirement and rejection of respondeat superior were not so much
motivated by economic concerns as they were by a desire to limit
municipal liability to its “own wrongful conduct.”206
As I argued earlier, I am not convinced that Monell’s municipal
liability standards can be untethered from the Court’s concerns
over protracted federal judicial involvement in institutional reform
City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 513 (1973).
See id. at 516 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (“I have expressed my doubts in Moor v.
County of Alameda . . . that our decision in Monroe v. Pape . . . bars equitable relief against
a municipality.” (citations omitted)).
202 See id. at 519–20 (“To the extent that the Sherman Amendment was directed only at
liability for damages and the devastating effect those damages might have on
municipalities, it seems that the defeat of the amendment does not affect the existence vel
non of an equitable action.”).
203 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 701, 701 n.66 (1978).
204 Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 37 (2010) (“Monell’s logic also argues
against any such relief-based bifurcation.”).
205 Id.
206 Id. at 38.
200
201

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

REVISIONIST MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

4/27/2018 8:49 AM

419

litigation. Moreover, the § 1983 liability regime is so messy that it
confounds such purported analytical consistency.207
2. Ex parte Young. A bifurcated approach that is more lenient
towards damages claims also runs counter to the underlying logic
of the arrangement vis-à-vis state liability.
The state
constitutional torts liability regime is illogically distinct from the
approach to local government. Under the Eleventh Amendment,
states enjoy sovereign immunity from private litigants’ damages
claims.208 In Ex parte Young, however, the Court held that private
litigants may seek to enjoin state officials from undertaking
unconstitutional actions.209 But the relief is limited in that any
funds required to provide the “equitable restitution” may not come
from the state treasury.210
The state liability line of cases thus offers a near mirror image
of the relief-based bifurcation regime that I propose—it precludes
damages liability entirely, while permitting injunctive relief
against the state. Given that the Eleventh Amendment does not
immunize local governments from their constitutional torts, it is
difficult to justify a more lenient equitable relief standard because
an adequate alternative remedy (i.e., damages) may (should) be
available. Damages relief may be made more feasible by not

207 See Jeffries, supra note 94, at 238 (observing that § 1983 doctrine “imposes
diametrically opposite liability rules on governmental defendants that are functionally
indistinguishable”).
208 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
applies to suits brought against a state by its own citizens as well as to suits brought by
citizens of other states or by citizens of foreign states); see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66–67 (1989) (noting that § 1983 “does not provide a federal forum for
litigants who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties”).
209 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908); see also Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra
note 135, at 1395–96 (describing Ex parte Young as “[t]he case that shunted aside the
traditional presumption against equitable relief,” and asserting that its impact “was
magnified by contemporaneous developments allowing federal courts to issue injunctions
when state courts could not do so”); id. at 1396–98 (identifying subsequent efforts by
Congress (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2283) and the Court (e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons) to limit
federal court injunctions).
210 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974) (finding that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that Ex parte Young did not preclude the retroactive monetary award at issue
because the award could be satisfied only by a “payment of state funds” and was “in
practical effect indistinguishable . . . from an award of damages against the State”). But see
id. at 667 (acknowledging that differences between permissible and impermissible relief are
difficult to discern and that prospective relief permitted under Ex parte Young may affect
state revenues).
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subjecting monetary claims to the same standards that have
historically been imposed where equitable relief is sought—the
very same high standards raised in Rizzo that permeate the
reasoning of Monell and its progeny.
3. Legislative History. It may be argued that a bifurcated
regime favoring damages claims over those seeking equitable
remedies runs counter to the legislative intentions that led to the
1871 Act. One of the primary concerns that motivated the earlier
version of § 1983 was inaction on the part of southern law
enforcement officials in response to private acts of violence against
African-Americans. Yet, as David Jacks Achtenberg persuasively
argues, the 42nd Congress was not averse to expansive damages
relief against local governments, including through vicarious
liability and respondeat superior.211 To be sure, injunctive relief
might appear the more effective and responsive remedy to compel
local law enforcement to protect victims of racist violence. But
notwithstanding Justice Douglas’s account in City of Kenosha,
nothing in the Act’s legislative history precludes bifurcating
liability based on relief, nor should it necessarily favor equitable
relief over damages relief standards.
Finally, as Michael Gerhardt argues, the Court has crafted a
§ 1983 jurisprudence that more closely resembles federal common
law, negating the need to mine legislative history consistent with a
holding.212 Moreover, Michael Wells demonstrates that the Court’s
§ 1983 jurisprudence—including its jurisprudence on municipal
liability—frequently “rel[ies] on policy considerations.”213 The
Court’s emphasis on federalism concerns, therefore, justifies a
bifurcated regime that affords damages remedies on a lesser
showing of liability than is required for equitable relief, the latter

211 Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, supra note 92, at 2203–04 (arguing that the
42nd Congress’s rejection of the Sherman Amendment was compelled by rationales of
respondent superior and reflected only congressional opposition to “making cities liable for
damages resulting, not from the conduct of their employees, but rather from racially
motivated mob violence occurring within the cities’ boundaries”).
212 See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Monell Legacy: Balancing Federalism Concerns and
Municipal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 557–58 (1989); see
also Achtenberg, Taking History Seriously, supra note 92, at 2248 (concluding that fidelity
to “the common law decision-making process” requires the Court to overrule Monell).
213 Wells, supra note 5, at 1049 (citing Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662, 638–50
(1980), and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813–14 (1982)).
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being the greater accelerant of overstepping federal courts in areas
of local concern.
D. CALCIFIED MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Forty years of Monell have calcified the opinion into a hardened
precedent that the Court is unlikely to budge by loosening
municipal liability standards or bifurcating relief.214 The Court
has proved itself reliably opposed to expanding constitutional tort
liability, shutting the door repeatedly on loosening the bounds of
qualified immunity or expanding federal causes of action.215
Taken together, these considerations, along with principles of
stare decisis, separation of powers, and, of course, federalism,
render it near-delusionary to expect the Court to revisit its
municipal liability jurisprudence. Accordingly, any bifurcated
municipal liability regime will need to usher from Congress.216
E. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER’S PROGRESSIVE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL

While legislation may sometimes emerge from the scrapheap of
judicial dicta, Chief Justice Warren Burger would appear an
unlikely source for a statute affording victims of police brutality a
realistically obtainable damages remedy against municipalities.
214 See Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma, supra note 179, at 1631
(“[T]he Court will hesitate to embrace any development aimed at facilitating constitutional
tort litigation.”).
215 See generally Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (finding federal officials entitled
to qualified immunity in a new Bivens context).
216 See Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma, supra note 179, at 1629 n.146
(“Immunity doctrine has been primarily the subject of judicial development, but its contours
do not appear to be constitutionally compelled. Congress would thus appear to have
substantial power to legislate on the question of official immunity and it has occasionally done
so.”). If not “near-delusional,” it may strike some readers as farcical to expect anytime soon
that Congress will legislate at all, let alone in the realm of police accountability. The 115th
Congress appears on pace with, or maybe even a bit behind, the past few Congresses’ recordbreaking low number of enacted laws. See Statistics and Historical Comparison: Bills by
Final Status, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Aug. 9,
2017); see also Norm Ornstein, Is This the Worst Congress Ever?, THE ATLANTIC (May 17,
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/is-this-the-worst-congress-ever/48
3075/ (documenting the unprecedented and “cringeworthy failures” of the 114th Congress and
suggesting that it might be the “worst Congress ever”); Jonathan Topaz, ‘Worst Congress Ever,’
by the Numbers, POLITICO (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/congress-nu
mbers-113658 (examining how the “singularly unproductive” 113th Congress measures up to
past Congresses)).
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But that is largely the framework he sketched out in his dissenting
opinion in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, where he objected to the Court’s crafting of a
damages remedy for a federal agent’s Fourth Amendment violation
that Congress had not authorized.217 Though he proposed only a
federal remedial scheme, Burger hoped that states would adopt
similar statutes, all of which “would move our system toward more
responsible law enforcement.”218 None of this rankled Burger’s
staunch federalist orientation.219
Writing during the interim between Monroe and Monell, Burger
called on Congress to enact a “remedy against the government
itself to afford compensation and restitution” to police misconduct
victims.220 Observing that lawsuits against individual officers had
not proven effective at stemming police misconduct, Burger’s
statute would have waived sovereign immunity, adhered to
respondeat superior principles, encompassed error and intentional
wrongdoing by officers, and vested jurisdiction in a specialized
tribunal.221
To be sure, Burger felt that any such remedy was outside the
Court’s creative power, as reflected in Bivens222 and later in his
joining the dissent in Monell. Yet, he envisioned that the judiciary
would have “the ultimate responsibility for determining and
articulating standards” in his remedial scheme.223
217 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
422–24 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I conclude . . . that an entirely different remedy is
necessary but it is one that in my view is as much beyond judicial power as the step the
Court takes today.”).
218 Id. at 423–24.
219 See James L. Volling, Warren E. Burger: An Independent Pragmatist Remembered, 22
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 39, 47 (1996) (describing the “hallmark of Warren Burger’s judicial
philosophy” as “seeking jurisprudential equipoise through common-sense weighing of
competing interests in the context of federalism”).
220 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 422 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger’s proposal also would have
required that the misconduct at issue be included within the “officer’s personnel file so that
the need for additional training or disciplinary action could be identified or his future
usefulness as a public official evaluated.” Id. at 423.
221 Id. at 421–23.
222 Id. at 412 (“Legislation is the business of the Congress, and it has the facilities and
competence for that task—as we do not.”).
223 Id. at 423. Burger also preferred the damages remedy to the suppression doctrine as a
limitation on police misconduct, noting its potential for affording “meaningful redress” for
victims rather than letting criminals go free. Id. at 424. While sympathetic to the innocent
victim, his proposal would have undone criminal defendants’ protections established pursuant
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The congressional response to Burger’s proposal and Bivens was
mixed. Congress amended the Federal Tort Claims Act to
substitute the United States as “generally liable on a simple
respondeat superior theory for the common law torts of its
employees.”224 But Congress declined to enact possible United
States liability for constitutional violations.225 Today, the need for
congressionally authorized local police accountability through
expanded compensation is even more pronounced.
V. A NEW MUNICIPAL LIABILITY DAMAGES STANDARD
This Part sketches out the details of a new statutory provision
for purposes of obtaining damages relief against local governments
and entities. The proposal builds off of § 14141, § 1983 case law,
and the interaction between qualified immunity and municipal
liability doctrines. The proposed statutory framework would, by
and large, remove the need for litigants to meet the strict
definitions of “policy” and “policymaker” or demonstrate
“deliberate indifference” or “moving force” causation in failure to
train, prevent, and discipline claims.
A. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

Under the proposed framework, municipal liability meriting
damages relief for police misconduct may be demonstrated in two

to the exclusionary rule. Burger’s proposal would have required that no evidence be excluded
from a criminal proceeding on the basis of a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 423.
224 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1081, 1090 (5th ed. 2003); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012) (granting the
U.S. district courts exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the U.S. for
injury caused by the negligent acts or omissions of its employees acting within the scope of
their employment); Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation (Westfall)
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (amending Title 28 of the United States
Code to provide for a remedy against the U.S. based on the negligent or wrongful acts of
U.S. employees). The FTCA, however, essentially immunizes individual officers from
common law tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2012) (“The remedy against the United
States . . . for injury . . . arising or resulting from the negligent or wrongful act or omission
of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment is exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding for money damages.”).
225 James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional
Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 123 (2009).
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different ways. In addition, the proposal expands individual
officer liability in certain circumstances.
1. Proposed Framework for Pattern or Practice Liability. A
person may in a civil action obtain appropriate damages relief
from the relevant local government authority when:
(a) the person has been subjected to a
constitutional harm (deprivation of
rights, privileges, or immunities secured
or protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States) by the local
government’s law enforcement officers;
and
(b) the constitutional harm is part of a
pattern or practice of conduct by the local
government’s law enforcement officers.
2. Proposed Framework for Lack of Policy Liability. A person
may in a civil action obtain appropriate damages relief from the
relevant local government authority when:
(a) the person has been subjected to a
constitutional harm;
(b) the local government authority has a
duty to prevent the harm, as evidenced
through a generally (national) accepted
norm, policy, or custom aimed at
preventing the harm;
(c) the local government authority lacks a
policy preventing the harm;
(d) the harm is a foreseeable consequence
of the lack of policy; and
(e) the lack of policy caused the harm.
The local government authority may not
be held liable for damages if it shows
that the lack of policy did not cause the
constitutional harm.
3.
Providing Notice of Constitutional Right. The existence of
a local government authority policy aimed at preventing a
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constitutional harm provides notice to any of the local
government’s law enforcement officers of the prohibition and
“clearly establishes” a constitutional right against such harms for
purposes of § 1983 civil actions against individual officers.
4. Pattern or Practice Liability. Section 1 of the legislative
proposal largely tracks the language and reasoning of § 14141. A
local government should be held responsible for a specific
constitutional harm that an individual officer perpetrates when the
same types of constitutional harms have been perpetrated in the
past by the local government’s officers. The local government’s
failure to prevent repeated harms amounts to—at a minimum—
acquiescence or tacit approval—and should therefore constitute a
“policy or custom” for purposes of securing local government liability
and a damages remedy. The lack of any specific order or directive
by a policymaker is immaterial. Conceiving of a pattern or practice
(i.e., what actually happens) as a de facto “policy” accords with Peter
Schuck’s observation that “low-level, bottom-up processes” and
“street-level bureaucrats” frequently determine policy.226
Critical questions may arise concerning this avenue for
municipal damages relief. First, when does a harm rise to the
frequency of a pattern or practice? Addressing § 1983 actions, the
Supreme Court has held that “[a] pattern of similar constitutional
violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to
demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to
train.”227 In the § 14141 context, the DOJ contends that a pattern
or practice requires “repeated and not isolated instances” of
constitutional violations.228 But, the DOJ qualifies, a court need
not find a “specific number of incidents” or be shown “statistical
evidence” to find a pattern or practice.229 Relying on International
226 Schuck, supra note 71, at 1778 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Richard Weatherley &
Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucrats and Institutional Innovation: Implementing
Special-Education Reform, 47 HARV. EDUC. REV. 171, 172 (1977)).
227 Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
228 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE CLEVELAND DIVISION
OF POLICE 12 (2014) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT] (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1997)), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-rele
ases/attachments/2014/12/04/cleveland_division_of_police_findings_letter.pdf. The Teamsters
opinion, however, elsewhere describes a “pattern or practice” as “standard operating
procedure—the regular rather than the unusual practice.” 431 U.S. at 336.
229 DOJ REPORT, supra note 228, at 12.
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Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, concerning Title VII
employment discrimination, the DOJ explains that the phrase
“ ‘was not intended as a term of art,’ but should be interpreted
according to its usual meaning ‘consistent with the understanding
of the identical words’ used in other federal civil rights statutes.”230
This broad definition in the § 14141 context has been subject to
little judicial review,231 but a capacious basis for municipal
damages liability may elicit resistance. Courts have struggled in
the § 1983 arena over what number of past violations would put
local government officials on notice such that municipal liability
should attach for the entity’s inaction.232 In Connick v. Thompson,
four members of the Court found that four instances of Brady
violations in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office
resulting in overturned convictions amounted to a pattern and
constituted notice for purposes of assessing foreseeability,
deliberate indifference, and failure to train.233 But the majority
did not address the requisite number of violations for a pattern,
treating the claim as one based on a single incident.234 The
ultimate question of how many instances amount to a pattern or
practice may necessarily be left for courts to determine.
Equally challenging under the present proposal is defining the
scope of constitutional harms within a pattern or practice. The
Justices disagreed in Connick about what degree of similarity is
required between the prior misconduct and the underlying
constitutional harm. The majority discounted the pattern of
preceding Brady violations because they did not involve—as was
at issue in the case—“failure to disclose blood evidence, a crime lab
report, or physical or scientific evidence of any kind.”235 In
Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.16).
See supra Part III (discussing cases addressing pattern or practice).
232 See WASSERMAN, supra note 96, at 132–33 (noting that much of the litigation in this
area “is over what constitutes a sufficient pattern of past violations . . . and the amount of
knowledge or notice the policymaker must have of the prior incidents”).
233 See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 104 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Brady violations in Thompson’s prosecutions were not singular and they were not
aberrational. They were just what one would expect given the attitude toward Brady
pervasive in the District Attorney’s Office.”).
234 See id. at 62–63 (majority opinion) (stating that the four prior instances of Brady
violations could not have put Connick on notice because they were not similar to the
violation at issue).
235 Id.
230
231
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contrast, the dissenters took a broader view of a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct, contending that the fact of the prior
Brady violations should have alerted the prosecutor’s office to the
foreseeability of the office’s unlawful, secret retention of crime lab
evidence.236 Thus, here too, courts will need to determine the
requisite degree of similarity between prior instances of
unconstitutional violations and the specific harm a plaintiff
alleges.
Despite the proposed statute’s expanded remedial
intentions, courts should incline toward finding a similar
relationship between constitutional harms and prior violations,
departing from the currently limiting municipal liability doctrine
associated with foreseeability and fault tests.237
Definitional concerns aside, plaintiffs also may encounter
evidentiary or informational challenges in prosecuting pattern or
practice claims. It may be difficult for claimants—particularly
low-income individuals—to obtain sufficient documentation of
prior misconduct in order to satisfy pleadings standards to
establish a pattern or practice.238 These hurdles are present, of
course, in current § 1983 municipal liability litigation as well, but
should be partly ameliorated by more generous interpretations of
the scope and number of preceding constitutional violations.
Plaintiffs may also, of course, avail themselves of § 14141-related
reports and findings to support their own pattern or practice
damages claims.239
5. Lack of Policy Liability. Under the “lack of policy liability”
provision, municipalities may be liable for damages for even single
instances of officer misconduct when they lack generally accepted
police department policies aimed at preventing the particular
See id. at 103–04 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See WASSERMAN, supra note 96, at 132–33.
238 Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 113, at 62 n.190 (“[P]otential private
plaintiffs are unlikely to have much exclusive information about patterns of conduct in a
police department, because patterns of misconduct may be more difficult for private actors
to identify . . . .”).
239 Rachel Harmon notes in her criticism of proposals according private individuals power
to bring equitable claims under § 14141 that they may interfere with, or even undermine,
government-initiated attempts at reform of the same police departments. Harmon,
Promoting Civil Rights, supra note 113, at 60–62. A significant increase in damages claims
concerning a department subject to structural reform investigation or oversight could raise
some of these same concerns, though the distinct forms of relief might render the critique
largely inapposite.
236
237
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constitutional harm at issue. This section holds liable those police
departments that do not meet the standards of most other police
departments, thereby recognizing a constitutional duty to prevent
certain police misconduct.240 In addition to securing compensation,
this feature is the most likely to encourage departments to adopt
nationally recognized constitutional police policies and practices in
order to avoid future liability.
The provision removes the high causation standard that proves
so difficult for many plaintiffs to surmount when no appropriate
policy is in effect. A lack of relevant policy thus amounts to a
presumption of municipal liability. Though a municipality may
demonstrate that the absence of a policy did not cause the
plaintiff’s constitutional harm, that burden is on the municipal
government, not the plaintiff. Plaintiffs may still obtain damages
when police departments have implemented appropriate policies,
but will not benefit from the same favorable municipal liability
standard of proof.
The notion of a constitutional duty to prevent police misconduct
has not eluded judicial review. In Rizzo the Court rejected
imposing a negligence standard, replete with a duty of care, on
local government and police officials. The Court discounted the
contention that government defendants had “a constitutional
This
‘duty’ . . . to ‘eliminate’ future police misconduct.”241
legislation would rectify the Court’s error.
The proposed standard accords, in part, however, with Justice
Blackmun’s articulation of constitutional duty. Blackmun argued
in his dissent in Rizzo for a more expansive reading of § 1983
liability, as described in Monroe: “§ 1983 ‘should be read against
the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for
the natural consequences of his actions.’ ”242 Even without a
240 See Cover, supra note 3, at 1836 (proposing that the lack of constitutionally excessive
force protective policies and training should establish municipal liability).
241 Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 376 (1976) (“Such reasoning . . . blurs accepted usages and
meanings in the English language in a way which would be quite inconsistent with the words
Congress chose in § 1983.”). Notably, all of the cases that the Court addressed relating to a
link between a pattern of misconduct involved pleas for injunctive relief. Id. at 373–77.
242 Id. at 384 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187
(1961)). Peter Schuck similarly argues that, in addressing municipal liability, the analysis
would be better aimed at questions of duty—as to what and whom—rather than causation.
Schuck, supra note 71, at 1765–72 (asserting that the real question in § 1983 cases is about
legal duty, and examining four examples of ways in which the contemporary scope of the
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specific policy ordering the constitutional violations, Blackmun
insisted that “[t]here must be federal relief available against
As
persistent deprival of federal constitutional rights.”243
Blackmun explained, police officials may have a “duty” to prevent
subordinate officers’ misconduct, rendering them liable under
§ 1983.244
While Blackmun’s opinion directly supports a constitutional
duty to prevent police misconduct when a pattern or practice of
constitutional violations exists, his reasoning indirectly supports a
constitutional duty where there is a general police policy and
practice to prevent particular constitutional violations. A national
consensus on such policies reflects an informed belief that a police
department must take specific steps and implement certain
procedures to prevent constitutional violations by its officers.
Resort to a consensus of local police department practices to
ascertain a constitutional standard or duty of care may be
analogized to the medical malpractice national standard of care.245
Commentators justify the trend toward a national medical
standard as preventing substandard medical treatment and
ensuring quality care irrespective of diverse geographic
locations.246 Adopting such national standards of police treatment
may be justified on similar grounds.
duty concept in private tort law has been “extended to impose broad, non-vicarious liability
in factual situations . . . analogous to many typical § 1983 cases”).
243 Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 382 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun would have held that a
supervising official’s conscious permission of a subordinate’s constitutional violation could
establish liability and lead to an equitable remedy, suggesting there was no legal difference
between officials’ “active encouragement and direction of” and “mere acquiescence in” police
misconduct. Id. at 385 n.2 (quoting Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir.
1969)).
244 Id. (quoting Schnell, 407 F.2d at 1086).
245 See JAMES A. HENDERSON JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 213 (8th ed. 2012) (“The
trend in recent years has been to depart from the ‘locality rule’ and to turn to the country as
a whole to determine medical custom, at least with respect to specialists.” (citations
omitted)); Michelle Huckaby Lewis, John K. Gohagan & Daniel J. Merenstein, The Locality
Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local Medical Practices vs the National Standard of
Care, 297 JAMA 2633, 2634 (2007) (documenting that twenty-nine states and the District of
Columbia follow a national standard of care).
246 See Lewis, Gohagan & Merenstein, supra note 245, at 2636 (noting equal informational
access for rural and urban doctors and that “persistence of [the locality] rule may serve to
promote the practice of substandard medicine”). Cf. HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 245, at
214 (acknowledging that “[t]he rejection of the locality rule is based on the assumption that
the quality of medical care ought not vary with the geographical area in which the
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6. Notice of Constitutional Right. The final section addresses
the potential scenario that municipalities will escape damages
liability where there is no pattern or practice of the constitutional
harms at issue and the municipality has a policy in effect that
meets the general standard. It may prove difficult for plaintiffs to
establish municipal liability in these circumstances. The section
therefore alters qualified immunity doctrine to hold that the local
government’s applicable policy “clearly establishes” the
constitutional prohibition on a certain action. As a result,
individual officers who violate that policy, which is aimed at
preventing the constitutional harm, may not claim they lack notice
under that prong of the clearly established test and, therefore,
merit immunity.247 The combination of the “Lack of Policy
Liability” section and the instant provision’s restructuring of the
law may incentivize municipalities to adopt constitutionally
compliant policies and more appropriately fix blame for
constitutional violations.248 Moreover, individual officers will not
escape liability, ensuring accountability and compensation.249
B. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS

1. Modesty. Critics may contend that the proposed statutory
framework for enhanced municipal damages liability does not go
far enough. Based on the revisionist account of municipal liability
set forth here, a critic may rightly question why the remedy is not
to overrule Monell and lift the ban on holding municipalities

defendant practices,” the authors question whether tort law is really an effective
instrument to achieve this end).
247 See Cover, supra note 3, at 1829–30 (describing a similar proposal).
248 This aspect of my proposal is similar to Brandon Garrett and Seth Stoughton’s “safe
harbor” proposal, which would eliminate municipal liability where a department “adopted
sound policies” in exchange for “expanded municipal liability and a departure from City of
Canton v. Harris, for patterns and practices of constitutional violations.” Brandon Garrett
& Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 301 (2017).
249 Of course, given the current state of indemnification practices, it is likely that
municipalities will continue to pay for their officers’ constitutional wrongs. See Joanna C.
Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912–13 (2014) (finding local
governments pay for more than 99% of the costs connected with settlements and judgments
arising from civil rights lawsuits against police officers).
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vicariously liable for the acts of their agents. Numerous members
of the Supreme Court and scholars have proposed just that. 250
The proposed framework may be defended against the “too
modest” remedy on several grounds. First, the proposal is likely to
cover much of the same conduct as would the doctrine of respondeat
superior, thereby achieving much of the same compensatory
objectives. Second, the delineations of liability in the proposed
framework offer a level of precision that may enable a government
entity that is so inclined to better examine and diagnose its
constitutional failings, including certain causation questions.251 By
contrast, a vicarious liability regime, which holds the government
entity responsible for all agents’ misdeeds, complicates the
introspective and reform-minded route that seeks to weed out
systemic problems. The prospects of police department “self-help”
through litigation, however, may be overstated, despite the
proposal’s more detailed bases of liability.252
Finally, the proposed framework’s more detailed bases for
municipal liability in conjunction with its change to qualified
immunity doctrine achieve a better balance in apportioning
blameworthiness than does respondeat superior’s blunter
assignment of entity responsibility. The proposed framework,
notwithstanding a local government’s potential policy and
contractual reasons for subsequently indemnifying its police
officers, more fairly allocates responsibility to the wrongdoer, and
may foster improved policies and practices.
250 See, e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 431–32 (1997) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (pointing out that the fact on which Monell relied—that the Congress that enacted
§ 1983 rejected the Sherman Amendment—“does not argue against vicarious liability for the
act of municipal employees—particularly since municipalities, at the time, were vicariously
liable for many of the acts of their employees”); Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The
Maze, the Mud, and the Madness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 962–63 (2015) (describing
general consensus that the most critical improvement to § 1983 litigation would be to permit
vicarious liability); Jon O. Newman, Here’s a Better Way to Punish the Police: Sue Them for
Money, WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/heres-a-betterway-to-punish-the-police-sue-them-for-money/2016/06/23/c0608ad4-3959-11e6-9ccd-d6005bea
c8b3_story.html?utm_term=.0edd37106e41 (proposing abolishing qualified immunity,
adopting local government vicarious liability, and authorizing the federal government to sue
police on victim’s behalf).
251 See Joanna C. Schwartz, Introspection Through Litigation, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1055,
1061–75 (2015) (describing possible informational benefits gleaned from defensive litigation).
252 Id. at 1082, 1096–1100 (addressing reasons police departments ignore potential insights
from litigation).
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2. Costs. More permissive liability standards for § 1983
monetary damages claims would doubtless significantly reduce
local treasuries. A first response: that is precisely the point. Too
many victims of police brutality do not receive damages for the
abuse they suffer due to police department action and inaction.
For too long courts have manipulated government immunity
doctrines to favor concerns about federalism, costs, and overdeterrence over compensating wronged individuals. Taking the
costs-savings rationale to its most extreme conclusion would not
only deny compensation to deserving individuals, but also erode
public trust and deprive society of a clarification of constitutional
rights. If the number of police brutality cases stretches judicial
resources and local funds, it is no answer to preclude damages
awards.253 Rather, the solution is to diminish the underlying
instances of police misconduct.
Second, while the primary purpose of the proposed framework
is to ensure more compensation for police abuse victims,
dramatically increased damages awards against municipalities
and officers may achieve the elusive deterrent effect that also
undergirds constitutional tort litigation. To the consternation of
civil rights advocates—and as volumes of law reviews attest—
§ 1983 litigation has not reduced police misconduct.254 A greater
financial penalty might finally make local governments and their
communities take notice and insist on internal police reform.
Moreover, the current state of police misconduct litigation
already visits substantial costs on local governments. Section
14141 litigation requires that local governments expend hundreds

253 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[W]hen we automatically close the courthouse door
solely on this [judicial resources] basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on the
comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests.”).
254 See Jeffries & Rutherglen, supra note 135, at 1418 (“Whatever the causes, it seems clear
that damages actions are not a generally effective remedy against abusive and excessive use of
force by law enforcement.”); id. at 1400–06 (reviewing the history of damages as a
constitutional remedy and suggesting that context and efficacy of damages should impact its
propriety); Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, supra note 17, at 453–54 (observing that
damages “success may not create leverage over the involved law enforcement officers and
agencies” in part because “municipal budgeting practices usually insulate police department
budgets from feeling any financial consequences of lawsuit payouts”).
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of millions of dollars on reforms.255 While some research suggests
that these costs may offset § 1983 litigation expenses by reducing
police misconduct,256 an expansion of municipal liability could
theoretically lead to locally imposed reforms precluding the need
for additional § 1983 lawsuits and § 14141 actions.
Finally, should damages in the aggregate prove intolerable, the
proposed framework could incorporate a cap on financial awards.
Several commenters have suggested that imposing a ceiling on
monetary relief or categories of misconduct would realize the
general objectives of widespread damages relief.257 By ensuring
that all deserving victims receive some award—albeit potentially
diminished—a damages cap also would realize the procedural
justice and normative objectives of constitutional torts litigation.
3.
Federalism.
The proposed framework’s diminished
municipal liability threshold will also rankle many concerned
Placing more local government police
about federalism.258
departments before federal judges implicates federalism—but in
the narrowest sense. As the revisionist account of municipal
liability demonstrates, an increase in damages lawsuits should not
arouse the protracted litigation and oversight concerns that
animated the Supreme Court’s original invocations of
federalism.259 And a possible cap on damages might further blunt
these concerns.260

255 See, e.g., Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 114, at 1407 n.338 (noting
that the total cost of structural reform litigation in Los Angeles was approximately $100
million); Eric Heisig, Cleveland Officials Acknowledge that Tax Increase is the Only Way to
Pay for Police Reform, cleveland.com (July 13, 2016), http://www.cleveland.com/court-justic
e/index.ssf/2016/07/cleveland_officials_acknowledg.html#incart_m-rpt-1 (describing a likely
income tax increase expected to generate more than $80 million in additional revenue in
order to pay for federal consent decree police reforms); see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 668 (1974) (noting the costs associated with equitable relief in the context of lawsuits
against state officials).
256 See Rushin, Structural Reform Litigation, supra note 114, at 1407 (recognizing that the
decline in the total number of civil rights claims filed against the LAPD and the
accompanying decrease in total payouts for civil rights suits suggest that structural reform
litigation “may ultimately pay for itself through decreased litigation costs”).
257 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 71, at 1784; Smith, supra note 1, at 482–83.
258 See, e.g., Black v. City of Memphis, No. 98-6508, 2000 WL 687683, at *3 (6th Cir. May
19, 2000) (“To apply a less stringent standard would cause municipal liability to collapse
into respondent superior liability, thus raising serious federalism concerns.”).
259 See supra Part III.
260 See supra Part V.B.2.
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In addition, as Fred Smith argues, local governments’ increased
authority and power since the 1870s, along with a commensurate
rise in common law accountability, support changes to
constitutional tort accountability.261 The same federal-local power
disparities and distinctive responsibilities are less pronounced
today.262 Reducing municipal liability standards would fall within
the logical and necessary progression of rising power and
attendant liability.
The proposed framework’s “national standard,” however, may
also raise its own issues concerning federalism and local
autonomy. Federally imposing—even if only legislatively—a policy
on all 18,000 police departments may offend some local policing
interests. Softer legislative power may instead be exercised by
conditioning grant money to local governments for police activities
that adopt federally identified policies, training, and standards.263
Yet the localized nature of policing is overstated. Most police
departments face similar concerns regarding use of force, weapons
training, patrol tactics, and the like.264 The need and virtue of
diverse approaches can be accommodated while arriving, in most
cases, at agreed-upon best police policies and practices.265 For
example, a small, rural police department might not have reason
See Smith, supra note 1, at 485–87.
See id. at 456–57 (noting the critical role that cities and counties play in carrying out
states’ residual police power).
263 See, e.g., H.R. 5221, 114th Cong. (2016) (proposing that local governments receiving
grants under the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program must train
police officers in—and utilize—de-escalation techniques).
264 See POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, DEFINING MOMENTS FOR POLICE CHIEFS 20
(2015), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/definingmoments.pdf (“One of the strengths of
American policing is that we have so many diverse agencies. But there are some areas
where we are not going to be able to maintain the luxury of agency-specific practices.
[Militarization of the police] is one of them.” (quoting COPS Office Director Ron Davis)).
265 See, e.g., POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE
1 (2016), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/30%20guiding%20principles.pdf (grounding its
report in “four national conferences; a survey of police agencies on their training of officers
on force issues; field research in police agencies in the United Kingdom and here at home;
and interviews of police trainers and other personnel at all ranks, as well as experts in
mental health”). Determining best practices based on other state approaches is hardly
uncommon. For example, courts will review and compare other jurisdictions’ prison policies
on religious accommodation in assessing whether a particular prison employs the least
restrictive means in burdening a prisoner’s religious beliefs. See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.
Ct. 853, 866 (2015) (construing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
and stating that “when so many prisons offer an accommodation, a prison must, at a
minimum, offer persuasive reasons why it believes that it must take a different course”).
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to adopt the same policies followed by a large, metropolitan
agency. In these circumstances, the local department could be
permitted to “opt” out of that specific, national consensus policy.
Finally, some may criticize deriving a constitutional duty from
various police department policies as the result of a “tenderhearted desire to tortify the Fourteenth Amendment” and an
improper expansion of constitutional liability.266 Though this
provision admittedly broadens constitutional liability, that the
duty emerges from a consensus of local police forces should allay
some federalism concerns.
The proposal bears some hallmarks of “new federalism”—the
notion that “[s]tate constitutions, too, are a font of individual
liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”267 Here, as well,
agreement between numerous local police agencies could augment
federal constitutional protections. Establishing a constitutional
duty on police misconduct by consensus of local police departments
is likely more representative, practical, manageable, and attuned to
police and local interests than establishing a duty through courts’
current, infrequent opining on constitutional standards without
regard to police department policies.
Ultimately, however, the Court’s concern over federalism in
Monell and subsequently is misplaced. And similar concerns
elicited by this proposal are also off the mark. Critics’ grief should
not be over the mechanisms that enforce government and official
liability. Rather, as Third Circuit Judge John Gibbons explained,
“[t]he fourteenth amendment and the civil rights statutes present
the threat to local authority.”268 That is, the constitutional and
statutory systems are designed to limit state and local government
action. Civil rights litigation, facilitated through appropriately
permissive standards, “merely compounds, or perhaps makes good,
that threat.”269
266 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2479 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Also
potentially problematic is that use of force policies often are not models of clarity, and
provide confusing or ambiguous guidance.
267 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
268 United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 223 (3d Cir. 1980) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting from an order denying rehearing).
269 Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court long ago proclaimed that “[t]he very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury.”270 This Article modestly proposes that
Congress provide that civil rights protection to victims of police
brutality by (1) better facilitating compensatory damages through
reducing municipal liability standards for damages claims and (2)
holding individual officers accountable for failing to comply with
constitutionally protective police department policies.
This
approach will not vitiate the borders of local autonomy, but will
bolster these communities’ constitutional limitations and hold
their governments, leaders, and officials accountable to the
Nation’s laws.
It may be the rare case that a damages award sufficiently
compensates a victim of police brutality. But where justice and
accountability for unlawful police practices so often prove elusive,
it is vital that a toll be properly levied. Without some civil remedy,
the public will struggle to keep faith in “a government of laws.”
Without some identification of wrongdoing and wrongdoer, the
people will lose confidence in the protections of the Constitution.

270

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).

